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ABSTRACT
Farmland cash rental markets is one general theme of this dissertation, with the first two
essays addressing specific topics related to cash rental rates. A better understanding of the
determinants of local cash rental rates and their adjustments to changing economic conditions
is important because an increasing and significant portion of farmland is being farmed by
tenant operators. Another common thread connecting all the three essays is that they attempt
to analyze the impact of biofuels on cash rents, corn/soybean acreage allocation, and gasoline
prices. The first essay seeks to establish the determinants of cropland cash rental rates in
Iowa using a unique panel data set. It provides evidence on how responsive rental rates are
to national commodity prices, in the short-run and in the long-run. These contributions
allow us to comment on how closely the Ricardian Rent Theory approximates real-world rent
determination. We find that it is an incomplete explanation, even in the long-run. The second
essay is concerned with embedded real option components in cash rental rates. Traditional
rent valuation methods are biased downward because they excludes the renter’s flexibility to
use more up-to-date price information when making crop and input intensity choices. We
develop an asset pricing model and employ the Monte Carlo simulation to better understand
this planting real option. The third essay explores the negative impact of ethanol production
on wholesale gasoline prices. The impact varies considerably across regions and comes at the
expense of refiners’ profits. Based on a transparent analytical model, the study concludes that
a net welfare loss arises from ethanol support policies.
11. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Recent biofuel expansion has changed market fundamentals and may give rise to a permanent
structural change in agricultural commodity prices. According to the “Land Values and Cash
Rents Summary” of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, between spring 2007 and spring 2008,
national average cropland cash rents per acre increased by $11, or 13%, while cash rents paid
for pastureland rose by $1, or 8.3%. A better understanding of the nature and determinants
of farmland cash rents has become increasingly important because a significant portion of
farmland is being farmed by tenant farmers. Another fact is that agricultural markets are
more closely tied to energy markets because of the increasing demand of biofuel. An analysis
of impacts of biofuels on agricultural and energy markets is warranted. This dissertation
involves three essays on these issues.
The first essay, “Determinants of Iowa Cropland Cash Rental Rates: Testing Ricardian
Rent Theory,” addresses the issue of cropland cash rental rates. The objectives of this study
are to (1) to find short-run determinants of crop rental prices, including roles of soil quality,
relative location, ethanol plant, and crop prices, (2) to analyze the dynamic adjustment process
of cash rental rates to changes in output prices, and to compare short- and long-run effects
of prices on rent, and (3) to provide evidence on the validity of Ricardian rent theory (RRT).
There are relatively few studies on this general topic.
For short-run analysis, following RRT, land rent is the highest bid a tenant farmer can afford
to pay for the use of the land. The standard translog variable profit function is employed to
model cash rents. Annual survey data of typical cash rental rates per acre of cropland of
Iowa over 1987-2007 is applied. We choose soil quality and distance to terminal market for
2each county as fixed inputs. County-level scale of livestock industry, local ethanol production
effect, normalized distance to nearby metropolitan areas, and adoption rate of genetically
engineered crops are chosen as county-specific factors influencing local cash rental rates. We
explicitly take into account (i) spatial autocorrelation due to neighboring counties, (ii) temporal
autocorrelation due to time-lagged behavior of farmland rental agreements, and (iii) individual
heterogeneity across counties. Various specification tests suggest that a random effects model
is appropriate. For long-run analysis, an error correction model is used to estimate (a) the
average long-run effect of expected corn price on cash rental rates, and (b) the potentially
heterogeneous, dynamic adjustment path for each county.
The second essay, “The Planting Real Option in Cash Rent Valuation,” is concerned with
embedded real option components in cash rents. Between entering into a rental agreement and
planting, a tenant farmer has the flexibility to “switch” between corn and soybeans and to
choose the input application level for the next crop year. The value of this planting flexibility
is largely driven by volatile input and output prices. Failure to account for this option value
will place downward bias on estimates of what farmers should pay to rent land. In this study,
we explicitly derive the real option value and provide empirical estimates on the contribution
of the crop switching and input intensity options to cash rent. Using local crop and input
prices as well as experimental production data, we quantify the values of these real options
by Monte Carlo methods. The multivariate dependence structure among yields and prices are
captured by a multivariate Gaussian copula.
The third essay, “The Impact of Ethanol Production On U.S. and Regional Gasoline Prices
and On Welfare,” quantifies the impact of the increase in ethanol supply on the U.S. gasoline
market, employing pooled regional time-series data from January 1995 to March 2008. We
separate the impact of ethanol from other forces driving gasoline prices, such as seasonality,
crude and product market conditions, refinery capacity, refinery market concentration, unex-
pected supply disruptions, and gasoline imports. The crack ratio and 3-2-1 crack spread are
employed to proxy the profitability of the refining industry. Regional analysis of the ethanol
impact is also conducted. Based on the estimated substitution effect of ethanol on gasoline
3and a transparent analytical model, we investigate the distribution of welfare changes from the
ethanol blenders tax credit among producers and consumers in the corn, ethanol, gasoline and
transportation fuel markets. The overall welfare impact is estimated.
The three essays are provided in the following chapters.
Conclusions Drawn
The three essays address important issues in farmland rental and energy markets and identify
major findings. The results in the first essay indicate that Iowa cash rental rates are largely
determined by output/input prices, soil quality, relative location, and other county-specific
factors. Cash rents go up by $50 for a $1 increase in corn price in the short run. The marginal
value of cropland quality, as represented by row-crop corn suitability rating index, is about
$2.11. Ethanol plants are not found to have a significant local effect on cash rental rates,
impacting local rental markets mainly through the national futures price. Scale of the local
livestock industry, closer proximity to big cities, adoption of genetically engineered crops, and
expected government subsidies have significant impacts on local cash rental rates. In addition,
changes in crop output prices and government subsidies are found to have long-run effects on
cash rental rates. The long-run change in cash rents is approximately $103-$112 for a $1 change
in corn price and is reached in about four years. The long-term pass-through of $1 government
payment into cash rental rates is about $0.65. The empirical results reject a narrow version of
the RRT.
In the second essay, Monte Carlo simulation results show that the average cash rent valu-
ation for the real option approach is 13.5% higher than that for the conventional net present
value (NPV) method, in which the input intensity option is 0.47%. Crop planting sequence
is shown to impact the real option value. The analysis in the third essay suggests that the
growth in ethanol production has caused wholesale gasoline prices to be 14¢ per gallon lower
than would otherwise have been the case. Furthermore, the negative impact of ethanol on the
retail gasoline prices is found to vary considerably across regions. The Midwest region has
the biggest impact at 34¢/gallon, while the Rocky Mountain region had the smallest impact,
47¢/gallon. The results indicate that the reduction in the gasoline price comes at the expense
of refiners’ profits and structural change in the refining industry significantly impact gasoline
prices. In addition, welfare estimates suggest a net welfare loss of $0.28 billion from the ethanol
support policies.
52. DETERMINANTS OF IOWA CROPLAND CASH RENTAL RATES:
TESTING RICARDIAN RENT THEORY
Abstract
Based on the Ricardian rent theory, this study employs the variable profit function to analyze
the determinants of Iowa cropland cash rental rates using county-level panel data from 1987
to 2007. Accounting for spatial and temporal autocorrelations, responses of local cash rental
rates to changes in output prices and other exogenous variables are estimated. We find that
Iowa cash rental rates are largely determined by output/input prices, soil quality, relative
location, and other county-specific factors. Cash rents go up by $50 for a $1 increase in corn
price in the short run. The marginal value of cropland quality, as represented by row-crop
corn suitability rating index, is about $2.11. Ethanol plants are not found to have a significant
local effect on cash rental rates, impacting local rental markets mainly through the national
futures price. Scale of the local livestock industry, closer proximity to big cities, adoption of
genetically engineered crops, and expected government subsidies have significant impacts on
local cash rental rates. In addition, changes in crop output prices and government subsidies
are found to have long-run effects on cash rental rates. The long-run change in cash rents is
approximately $103-$112 for a $1 change in corn price and is reached in about four years. The
long-term pass-through of $1 government payment into cash rental rates is about $0.65. Our
research may be viewed as a test of the Ricardian rent theory where the data reject a narrow
version of the theory.
Key words: bargaining, basis, ethanol, rate of adjustment, spatial autocorrelation.
6Introduction
Iowa is one of the major crop growing states in the United States, producing 18% of U.S.
corn and 17% of soybeans in 2007. As a result of rapid expansion in the ethanol industry, the
amount of corn used for ethanol production increased from 600 million bushels in 2001 to 2.7
billion bushels in 2007. Biofuel-derived demand for corn pushed up the price of corn, which
nearly doubled between September 2006 and December 2007. Farmland is the main financial
asset of crop farmers. In 2007, the total value of Iowa’s 32.6 million acres of farmland was
about $128 billion and the average value per acre was $3,908 (Iowa State University Extension
2007a). A better understanding of the determinants of local cash rental rates is important
because, for Iowa, an increasing fraction of farmland is being farmed by tenant operators.
Excluding land in government programs, the amount of land that is rented increased from 43%
to 59% between 1982 and 2002. By 2002 more than two-thirds of the leased farmland was
under a cash rent arrangement (Iowa State University Extension 2004).
In the Ricardian rent theory, rent is defined as “that portion of the produce of the earth,
which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil”
(Ricardo 1821, p. 67). Ricardo argued that rent is what remains from gross farm revenue after
all the production costs have been paid. In Ricardo’s view, rent is the value of the difference in
productivity, which is crucial in determining the existence and magnitude of land rent. Ricardo
explained this by pointing out that in the first settling of a country, only the very best lands go
under cultivation. When the last piece of land is cultivated, production cost equals the sum of
wage cost and the normal rate of profit. If rent on this last piece of land is zero, then farmers
are indifferent between farming and not farming. But on the more productive land, higher
productivity produces a surplus that is expropriated by the landlord in the form of rent.
Economic theory suggests that higher crop production profits resulting from high grain
prices will ultimately accrue to the farmland owners because farmland, not labor, is the most
limiting resource in agriculture. It is reasonable to assume that tenant farmers are identical
and in plentiful supply since much of farm labor involves reproducible technical skills. Demand
for farm labor has fallen in recent times because of mechanization and other labor-saving
7technologies. From 1960 to 2004, total labor (hired, self-employed and unpaid family) use in
Iowa agriculture declined by about 90% (Huffman 2007). Much of this labor has been available
to re-enter agriculture, if only because many farmers have reluctantly turned to part-time off-
farm employment. Hence, farmland becomes the residual claimant of profits. Farmers bid
aggressively to expand their land base, which ensures that rent payments equal the difference
between revenues and other costs.
This study presents a hedonic analysis of short- and long-run determinants of Iowa cropland
cash rental rates, including the dynamic adjustment process of cash rental rates to changes in
output prices and government subsidies. In doing so, it provides evidence on the validity of
the Ricardian rent theory. The literature on formal analysis of farmland cash rental rates is
limited. Representative is Kurkalova, Burkart, and Secchi (2004) who estimated the cropland
cash rental rates in the Upper Mississippi River Basin in 1997 by expressing the per acre cash
rental rate as a function of the corn yield estimate. In the literature on seeking to measure
the incidence of agricultural subsidies on land rents, several papers have discussed different
ways of modeling farmland rental rates. Lence and Mishra (2003) modeled land rents as a
function of acreage-weighted corn and soybean revenues and government payments. Goodwin,
Mishra, and Ortalo-Magne´ (2004) developed regressions of cash rents against expected market
earnings, expected government payments, and indicators of urban pressure.
The land rent literature is distinct from, but strongly related to, the land price literature.
In that literature, land rent is the most widely accepted factor affecting farmland price. Early
studies found evidence to support a causal relationship between land rents and farmland prices.
They tended to conclude that residual returns, or rents, unidirectionally influence farmland
prices (Phipps 1984; Awokuse and Duke 2006). But because of the apparent divergence between
comparatively stable farm income levels and continuously increasing land prices, people have
sought other theoretical and empirical frameworks to help explain farmland price movements.
The focus of this study is on the farmland rental market instead of the asset market.
Compared with land asset prices, land rents more likely reflect optimal pricing behavior as they
are less vulnerable to asset bubbles and present less severe transaction costs issues. Although
8some progress has been made toward finding the relationship between land rents and land
prices, the literature has not fully investigated the nature and determinants of land rents. A
better grasp of the fundamentals of farmland cash rents might help us better understand land
pricing issues. Thus, there is a need to examine what factors influence the level of land rents
and how land rents respond to changes in exogenous variables. In this study, a unique data
set of local cash rental rates is exploited. It consists of county-level cash rental rates for the
state of Iowa from 1987 to 2007. The data were collected from an annual survey conducted by
Iowa State University Extension. It appears to be unique because, to our knowledge, no other
consistently collected county-level data covers any state in the United States.1
Our contributions are three-fold. First, we find the short-run determination of cash rental
rates in Iowa. In particular we estimate how they are affected by output/input prices, soil qual-
ity, relative location, and other county-specific factors. We also find that cash rents change by
$50 for a $1 change of corn price in the short run. The marginal value of cropland quality is
about $2.11, as represented by the row-crop corn suitability rating (CSR) index. And ethanol
plants are not found to have a statistically significant local effect on cash rental rates, as their
effects are largely channeled through national futures prices. Scale of local livestock industry,
urban proximity, adoption rate of genetically engineered crops, and expected government sub-
sidies have significant impacts on local cash rental rates. Our second contribution is to contrast
short- and long-run responses to corn prices and government subsidies. The long-run response
of land rents is approximately $103-$112 for a $1 change in corn price, which could be reached
in three to four years. Adjustment paths to the long-run equilibrium vary considerably across
the state. The total long-term effect of a $1 change in direct government subsidy is about
$0.65.
Our third contribution is to provide evidence on the validity of the Ricardian rent theory
(RRT) in Ricardo’s original and classical application, namely, the farmland rental market. We
believe we are the first to do so. Different from farmland in the arid West, where water rights
1Most other rental rate datasets have either county-level data for shorter periods of time or long time series
data but only across fewer statistical regions. For example, University of Minnesota Extension has collected
county-level data from 2002 to 2007. University of Nebraska Extension has data for 1981-2007, but only by
agricultural statistical districts.
9are important, deep-soiled, well-watered farmland in rural Iowa is close to a “commodity” in
crop production. Hence, our cash rental rates data are close to ideal for the purpose of testing
the theory. In the short-run analysis, the RRT has been straightforwardly applied to farmland
rental markets. It seems to handle the observed hedonic characteristics fairly well, giving
plausible explanations for the determinants of local cash rental rates. But in the analysis of
rent responses to a $1 increase in corn price, it comes up short. By contrast with the average
value of $140 predicted by the theory, the rent response in the short run is estimated to be
only $50 from the variable profit function. We conjecture that the low estimation result is due
to inertia in leasing contract re-negotiations. Inertia can be explained by relationship-specific
investments, community ties, and other related issues.
Hence, in addition to contemporaneous and static estimation, we also apply long-term,
dynamic analysis. We obtain the long-run price effect of $103-$112, which still doesn’t fully
cover the theoretical value. We formally test the RRT to conclude that the long-run response
of cash rent to a $1 corn price change is less than expected yield to which the price change
applied. We speculate that part of the reason for the discrepancy may be that intellectual
property rights owned by seed suppliers provide them with bargaining power, so that they
benefit in the process of cash rents allocation. In other words, the bargaining assumptions
underlying the RRT may not be valid. And some of the disparity may also be explained by
price and income supports provided by government programs, which may eliminate cash rent
responses to output price movements when prices are low, that is, higher prices are offset by
lower subsidies.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, a model of farmland cash rental rates is developed
using the variable profit function framework. A more detailed description of data follows. Then
we present the estimation method for a random effects model that takes into account spatial
and temporal autocorrelations. We also explain and analyze the estimation results. The
dynamic effects of corn prices and government subsidies on cash rental rates are examined.
Finally, concluding remarks are presented.
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Methods
Consider a tenant farmer facing a multiple output production technology that has M variable
outputs and inputs denoted by yi, i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}. Here, outputs are positive, yi > 0, and
inputs are negative, yi < 0. There are also N fixed inputs denoted by zh, h ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. At
the beginning of a production period, he/she rents land, which is in fixed supply in a certain
region. The tenancy involves a formal contractual agreement, and the duration of a contract is
for a year, which is renewable and renegotiable annually. In the production period, the tenant
farmer makes all the input and production decisions. He/she also pays a fixed cash rental rate
to the landowner. Following the RRT, land rent is the highest bid a tenant can afford to pay
for the use of the land. It is the rental value which will make the tenant farmer indifferent
between farming and not farming.
Let R be the fixed cash rental rate, pi, i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} be the output/input prices, and
let xl, l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L} denote region-specific factors. The time variable t is included to proxy
technological change, which leads to increased per acre grain yields. ForQ, the set of technically
feasible output and input choices, the cash rental rate for one unit of land is determined by
R(p; z,x, t) = pi(p; z,x, t) = max
{
M∑
i=1
piyi; (y; z,x, t) ∈ Q
}
.
Here, y, p, z, and x are the vectors of the outputs/inputs, output/input prices, fixed in-
puts, and region-specific factors, respectively. Thus, rent is the profit, or residual farm return
(farm return less variable costs), obtained from the use of rented land given the production
possibilities set Q.
The cash rental rate R(p; z,x, t) has the following properties (Chambers 1988, p. 120),
which ensure that a one-to-one relationship exists between the production technology and
its dual transformation: (1) homogeneous of degree one in p; and (2) non-decreasing (non-
increasing) and convex in pi if i is an output (input). The convexity of the cash rental
rate function in prices pi, i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} requires that the Hessian matrix with element
∂2pi/∂pi∂pj , i, j ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} be positive semi-definite.
The transcendental logarithmic function form (Chambers 1988, p. 180; Weaver 1983; McKay,
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Lawrence, and Vlastuin 1983) is employed for the cash rental rates function and is written as
ln(R) = α0 +
M∑
i=1
αi ln(pi) +
1
2
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
γij ln(pi) ln(pj) +
N∑
h=1
βhzh +
1
2
N∑
h=1
N∑
k=1
φhkzhzk
+
M∑
i=1
N∑
h=1
δih ln(pi)zh +
M∑
i=1
φit ln(pi)t+
N∑
h=1
ϕhtzht+
L∑
l=1
ηlxl + φtt+
1
2
φttt
2 (2.1)
Symmetry conditions need to be imposed to ensure the profit function is fully identifiable.
Linear homogeneity of cash rental rates function in prices pi, i = 1, 2, ...,M, requires further
restrictions. The restrictions are
Symmetry: γij = γji, φhk = φkh. (2.2)
Homogeneity:
M∑
i=1
αi = 1,
M∑
i=1
γij = 0,
M∑
i=1
φit = 0,
M∑
i=1
δih = 0. (2.3)
We impose the linear homogeneity condition in p by normalizing all input/output prices
and price-related variables by one of the output prices, say, pM . Thus, equation (2.1) can be
rewritten as the following, where p∗ = (p1/pM , p2/pM , ..., pM−1/pM ) and R∗ = R/pM .
ln(R∗) = α0 +
M−1∑
i=1
αi ln(p∗i ) +
1
2
M−1∑
i=1
M−1∑
j=1
γij ln(p∗i ) ln(p
∗
j ) +
N∑
h=1
βhzh +
1
2
N∑
h=1
N∑
k=1
φhkzhzk
+
M−1∑
i=1
N∑
h=1
δih ln(p∗i )zh +
M−1∑
i=1
φit ln(p∗i )t+
N∑
h=1
ϕhtzht+
L∑
l=1
ηlxl + φtt+
1
2
φttt
2 (2.4)
Equation (2.4) is estimated based on the data described in the next section.
Data
In this study, we used annual survey data of typical cash rental rates per acre of cropland for the
state of Iowa over the period 1987-2007 as reported in Iowa State University Extension (2007b).
Copies of a questionnaire were mailed to potential respondents in March each year. Potential
respondents were persons employed in one of the following occupations: (1) agricultural lenders,
(2) real estate brokers, (3) professional farm managers, (4) farmers, and (5) landowners. In the
survey, the respondents provide information based on their best judgments about typical cash
rental rates for cropland at the county level. The survey is to be mailed back by early May.
For each county, there are about 15-20 responses by individuals doing business in that county
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or a neighboring county. This data set provides a reasonably accurate measure of typical cash
rents of corn and soybean farmland for Iowa counties.
While initiated in 1980, the actual survey data didn’t cover all 99 counties of Iowa until
1997. In order to ensure temporal variation in our panel data set, we choose the cash rental
rates data covering 83 counties in Iowa.2 Of the 99 counties, we include most northern and
western counties. The 16 counties in the southeast corner of the state are left out because of
data limitations. Most of the missing counties started to collect cash rental rates data after
1995. In addition, proportion of land cash rented in missing counties is below state average
(28-31% vs. 37%). The cash rental rates for the 83 counties in 2007 are shown in figure 2.1.
We choose y =(corn, soybean, fertilizer) as the outputs and variable input; z =(soil quality,
distance index to terminal market) as fixed inputs. County-level scale of livestock industry,
local ethanol production effect, normalized distance to nearby metropolitan areas, adoption
rate of genetically engineered crops, and expected government subsidies are chosen as county-
specific factors influencing local cash rental rates. Each of these chosen variables and its
relationship to local cash rental rates is now discussed in greater detail.
Output and Input Prices
In Iowa, most corn is planted between April 20 and May 10. The optimum time to plant varies
from year to year; however, having planting done by mid-May is a goal most producers strive
to achieve (Iowa State University Extension 2001). Similarly, the optimum planting time for
soybeans is from May 5 to June 1. Crops are harvested from September to November of the
same year. In each spring, tenant farmers must make decisions on planting and input choices
as well as formulate marketing plans for the new crop year. They can observe and use price
information from the futures contracts expiring right after harvest time to formulate harvest
price expectations. On the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), the December contract for corn
and the November contract for soybeans are the first available futures contracts after harvest
time. Hence we use spring average prices of corn and soybean futures contracts as expected
2Detailed information about missing data, omitted counties, and data treatment are in the Appendix.
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output prices in our study. They are calculated as the average daily settlement prices for
the December (November) maturity futures contract during April for corn (soybeans).3 The
producer price index for nitrogen fertilizer is used as the input price, which can be found in
the ERS/USDA data set “U.S. Fertilizer Use and Price.”
Soil Quality
Soil quality is the capacity of the soil to function in agricultural production. Corn suitability
rating (CSR) index is used in this study, which is developed in Iowa to rate each type of soil for
its potential row-crop productivity (Iowa State University Extension 2006). The CSR considers
average weather conditions as well as frequency of use of the soil for row-crop production.
Ratings range from 100 for soils that have no physical limitations, occur on minimal slopes,
and can be continuously row-cropped, to as low as 5 for soils with severe limitations for row
crops. Land with a CSR rating below 65 is generally considered to be unsuitable for row crop
production.
The CSR can be used to rate the potential yield of one soil against that of another over a
relatively long period of time. In our case, we assume the CSR remains unchanged over our
sampling period. Each soil type in Iowa has a CSR. By identifying the soil types and acres of
each soil type in a tract of land, a weighted average CSR can be computed for the tract. We
use the county average row-crop CSR index to measure soil quality in this study, as reported
in Iowa State University Extension (2007b). The average row-crop CSR index map of Iowa is
shown in figure 2.2.
Since the CSR measures the general soil productivity, good corn farmland is also considered
to be good soybean land. Figure 2.2 illustrates that a large proportion of land in Iowa is high-
grade farmland and can be planted to crops. Most counties have an average row-crop CSR
index above 70. Farmland in North Central Iowa has higher quality than land elsewhere.
Southern Iowa has the lowest quality farmland compared with the rest of the state, mainly
because it tends to have higher erodibility and more weatherd soils. This includes most of the
3The reason we use the average April price is explained in the next section.
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omitted counties, where survey coverage did not commence until the mid-1990s.
Distance to Terminal Market
Counties located closer to the Mississippi River have a transportation advantage since these
locations provide better access to international and domestic terminal markets. For farmers
in these counties, it has been beneficial to transport their harvest by waterway, the cheapest
mode of transportation. We develop the relative location of each county in both south-north
(BN ) and east-west directions (BW ). And these two indices are used to build the following
Euclidean metric to reflect a county’s relative distance to terminal market and transportation
cost B =
√
B2N +B
2
W .
Taking advantage of the rectangle shapes and arrangement of most counties in Iowa, we
identify the indices BN and BW for the southeast corner of the state (Lee County) as 1 and
2.5, respectively. The indices increase by one as a county locates one county further north or
west of the state. The relative location index B is then calculated correspondingly.
Scale of Livestock Industry
Iowa ranked seventh in U.S. cattle production in 2006. Cattle are raised all around the state.
Iowa also leads the nation in pork production, raising 25% of U.S. hogs in 2006. The livestock
industry has been the Iowa corn grower’s most important customer. Prior to the expansion
of the ethanol market, two-thirds of Iowa’s corn crop had gone to feed livestock. The scale
of livestock in a county should increase local corn demand and thus increase cropland rental
prices.
We use density of livestock in each county to represent a county’s scale of livestock industry.
It is obtained by dividing total grain-consuming animal units in each county by its total
farmland acres. An animal unit is a standard unit for comparing actual animal numbers for
the main types of livestock raised in Iowa, including cattle, hogs, and sheep/lambs. An animal
unit is based on the dry-weight quantity of feed consumed by the average milk cow during
the base period. We adopted a set of animal unit conversion factors, developed by the U.S.
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Department of Agriculture (1974), to relate feed consumption for each type of livestock to the
feed consumed by the average milk cow.
Data were obtained from various sources. The county-level annual cattle (1987-90, 2001-07),
hogs (1987-89), and sheep/lambs (1987-90) quantity data were downloaded from the website
of the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS 2007). The three years (1992, 1997, and
2002) of Census of Agriculture data from NASS are used to linearly interpolate the missing
data. Data of county farmland acres are from 2002 Census of Agriculture.
Ethanol Plant Effect
The effect ethanol plants have on corn price and basis has been an issue investigated in several
papers. McNew and Griffith (2005) examined the impact of ethanol plants on local grain
market prices by estimating the effects of 12 ethanol plants in the Midwest that opened in 2001
and 2002. They found that these new ethanol plants increased local grain prices. Gallagher,
Wisner, and Brubacker (2006) conducted a cross-sectional price-location analysis for 270 cities
and towns in Iowa in spring 2003 to determine the impact of ethanol plants on local corn
prices. The results showed that for four conventional non-farmer-owned firms, price increases
as one gets closer to the processing plants, while five of six farmer cooperatives failed to show
any statistically significant effect on nearby prices. Olson, Klein, and Taylor (2007) found the
impact of ethanol production on corn basis varies by district in South Dakota from $0.04 to
$0.27 per bushel, with a state average impact of $0.24 in 2005.
Iowa had an early start in corn-based ethanol production. By the end of 2007, there were 30
ethanol plants with total production capacity of 2.04 billion gallons. In this study, an index of
the ethanol plant effect is constructed by summing a county’s corn demand from nearby ethanol
plants using Eit =
∑Nt
n=1win(t)Cn. Here win(t) is the proportion that county i has in the corn
supply area of ethanol plant n at year t. Cn is production capacity of the nth ethanol plant.
Each corn supply area is assumed to be a circle centered at the ethanol production facility, and
to be proportional to the production capacity of that plant. Nt is the total number of ethanol
plants in production at time t. All counties inside each corn supply area share the total supply,
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i.e., the proportion ranges from 0 to 1 and the sum over all counties is 1. Following opening
dates of ethanol plants, we construct the panel data of the effect of ethanol production on all
sample counties for the period 1987-2007. Figure 2.3 shows the ethanol plants in operation
by the end of 2007 and the corresponding corn supply areas, which are based on the map
constructed in Wisner (2006).
But the cash rents data may not be disaggregated enough, spatially and temporally, to fully
capture the local effect of ethanol plants. This may be especially true when an ethanol plant
is not located at the geographic center of a county. It is difficult to identify the true hinterland
of an ethanol plant, as it depends on fine local geography. The vast majority of ethanol
production capacity came online since January 2004. This new capacity has been spatially
dispersed, but mainly in the North Central and Northwest of the state. We also notice that
ethanol demand for corn has affected the corn prices pattern across Iowa since January 2006
(Hart 2007). Typically, by contrast with the strongest basis in East Iowa, North Central and
West Iowa tend to have the weakest basis, which is mainly determined by transportation costs.
This basis pattern is consistent with what we attempt to capture by the distance to terminal
market variable in this study. Many ethanol plants opened between fall 2005 and fall 2007 and
this is likely the reason for the basis shift in North Central and Northwest Iowa.
Urbanization Effect
Land price in the farmland market is greatly influenced by development pressure of accessible
urban areas (Shi, Phipps, and Colyer 1997). While Iowa is not a rapidly developing state, urban
expansion, together with other non-farming motives for purchases, are among the long-term
factors influencing Iowa’s farmland market (Duffy 2004). Close proximity to big metropolitan
areas increases development pressures and could possibly lead to higher cash rental rates.
The influence of urban development on local farmland rental markets should increase with
the size of urban population and decrease with the distance between two locations. Hence,
the urbanization influence of a metropolitan area on each county is measured by the distance
between them, normalized by the population in that area. The urbanization effect index
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for county i is represented by the minimum value of all urbanization influences as UEi =
min (dij/nj) , ∀j, where dij is the distance between county i and metropolitan area j, j ∈
{1, 2, ..., 10} in our case, and nj is the population size of that metropolitan area.
By the ranking for population of metropolitan statistical areas the in U.S. (U.S. Census
Bureau 2000), the 10 biggest metropolitan areas in Iowa are chosen. The included areas
are Omaha/Council Bluffs, Des Moines, Davenport/Moline/Rock Island, Cedar Rapids, Sioux
Falls, Waterloo/Cedar Falls, Sioux City, Iowa City, Dubuque, and Ames. Population data are
obtained from the U.S. Census 2000. Google Maps data are used to measure the distances
between the geographic center of each county and nearby metropolitan areas.
Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops
In Iowa there has been widespread adoption of genetically engineered (GE) crops since their
introduction in 1996. One of the most important benefits of GE crops has been to confer
tolerance to herbicides that are used for weed control (Byrne et al. 2004). Another important
benefit of GE crops is to confer protection against insect pests. Pesticide and labor saving
effects of GE crops have been long recognized in practice and documented in the literature
(Qaim and Zilberman 2003). In addition, the majority of the results of field tests and farm
surveys show that GE crops produce slightly higher yields than conventional crops.
Labor savings obtained from less weeding and pesticide spraying lead to a drop in labor
demand for a given level of output. With a fixed amount of labor, machinery input, and time
available in a planting season, a higher adoption rate of GE crops is expected to result in excess
production capacity in the short run. In turn, this should motivate tenant farmers to compete
for more farmland through bidding up cash rental rates. From these reasons, we expect that
adoption of GE crops should have a significant positive effect on cash rental rates. Herbicide-
tolerant soybean adoption rates in the United States, as given by total planting acreage data,
are drawn from the ERS/USDA data set “Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the
U.S.”
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Expected Government Subsidies
Government subsidy payments have important effects on farmland cash rents. Whether farmers
are the ultimate recipients and to what extent they benefit from government payments are
still open questions. As tenant farmers sign rental contracts in August of the previous year,
government payments are not realized and unobservable. So the cash rental rates depend,
in part, on farmers’ expectations about the future payments. In terms of estimation, this
expectation error biases the estimated coefficients toward zero. In dealing with this difficulty,
Roberts, Kirwan, and Hopkins (2003) take advantage of the unusual payments structure in 1997
and use them as an instrumental variable to identify the incidence of government payment on
land rents in 1992. They found that $0.34-$0.41 of every $1 of government payment is reflected
in the land rents. From Kirwan (2005), we learn that landlords capture $0.25 of the marginal
subsidy. Using Iowa county-level panel data over the 1996-2000 period and one-year lagged
subsidy realizations as instruments, Lence and Mishra (2003) concluded that a $1 additional
total government payment pushed up cash rental rates by $0.13 per acre. Goodwin, Mishra,
and Ortalo-Magne´ (2004) utilize four- or five-year historical averages of county-level total
payments to represent expected government payments. They indicate that an additional $1 in
loan deficiency payments raises the cash rents by $0.57.
Following the lines of Lence and Mishra (2003), we construct one-year lagged county-level
government payments on a per acre basis to represent the expected government payments for
tenant farmers. Federal-level government commodity payments of 1986-1994 are obtained from
the Farm Service Agency of the USDA. They are then divided by the total planted corn and
soybeans acres to convert to per acre payments. The resulting payments are multiplied by
yields ratio between Iowa and national average to reflect local payment levels. Iowa county-
level commodity subsidies for 1995-2006 are downloaded from the website of the Environmental
Working Group and divided by sum of acres planted with corn and soybeans to place in dollar
per acre units.
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Estimation
Since cash rental rates are not accounting profits, we do not have a breakdown of profit
sources. Therefore it is inappropriate to use the commonly applied seemingly unrelated re-
gressions (SUR) estimation procedure to jointly estimate the parameters in output supply and
input demand share equations. Using soybean price as the nume´raire price, we consider the
estimation of equation (2.4) based on the panel data of 83 counties over 1987 to 2007.
In dealing with this panel data set, we explicitly take into account (1) spatial autocorrela-
tion due to neighboring counties; (2) temporal autocorrelation due to time-lagged behavior of
farmland rental agreements; and (3) individual heterogeneity across counties. The county-level
data are organized by spatial units of observations. The existence of spatial dependence fol-
lows from the existence of a variety of spatial interaction phenomena. The estimations errors
of these contiguous counties are correlated. The test result for spatial autocorrelation based
on Moran’s I statistic (Anselin 1988, p. 101) is ZI = 88.74, and is statistically significant.
Farmland rental agreements are also liable to exhibit lagged behavior over time. Temporal au-
tocorrelation in the error term is expected. Applying the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation
in panel data (Wooldridge 2002, p. 282), we get the value of the F -statistic as 244.40, which
is statistically significant and confirms our expectation.
Next, we account for heterogeneity across counties by using the random effects estimator.
To justify the random effects model, a one-sided Breusch and Pagan’s Lagrange Multiplier test
(Greene 2003, p. 224) for the null hypothesis of no random effects, σ2µ = 0, yields a χ
2
1 test
statistic of 3281.34, which is statistically significant. However, we are still concerned about
possible correlation between the regressors and the random effects. To address this concern,
we compute a Hausman test statistic for misspecification (Greene 2003, p. 301), based on
the difference between the fixed effects and random effects estimators. This yields a χ214 test
statistic of 10.45 with P > χ214 = 0.73, which is not statistically significant. Therefore, we fail
to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Consequently the random effects estimator is found
to be both consistent and asymptotically efficient.
With these complications, there is no ready-to-use procedure to estimate equation (2.4).
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Following the likelihood function derivation in Baltagi et al. (2007), we extend the estimation
procedure proposed by Elhorst (2003) to a panel data random effects model accounting for
both spatial and temporal autocorrelations.4 Our panel data regression model is specified as
yti = X ′tiβ + uti (2.5)
where i ∈ {1, ..., N} denotes the cross-section dimension and t ∈ {1, ..., T} denotes the time
series dimension. The cash rental rate on the ith county for the tth time period is yti. The K
dimensional vector of explanatory variables defined in equation (2.4) is Xti.
By assumption, disturbance term uti has random county effects, spatially autocorrelated
residual disturbances, and first-order serially correlated residual disturbances. Employing a
random effects model, we have the disturbance term for time t:
ut = µ+ t (2.6)
where ut = (ut1, ..., utN )′. And µ = (µ1, µ2, ..., µN )′ denotes the unobserved individual random
effects for the counties. We assume µ iid∼ N(0, σ2µ) to be independent of . Vector t =
(t1, ..., tN )′ represents the residual disturbance and can be expressed as
t = δWt + νt and νt = ρνt−1 + et (2.7)
where νt = (νt1, ..., νtN )′ and et = (et1, ..., etN )′. The spatial autocorrelation coefficient satisfy-
ing |δ| < 1 is δ, while ρ is the temporal autocorrelation coefficient.
W is the spatial contiguity matrix and is constructed based on the notion of binary conti-
guity between spatial units, i.e., two counties having a common border of non-zero length are
considered to be contiguous. A value of 1 is assigned for the corresponding matrix element;
otherwise the element is 0. The diagonal elements of W are all 0 since one spatial unit can’t
be its own neighbor. And the rows of the W matrix are standardized so that they sum to one.
With the normality assumption of eti ∼ N(0, σ2e), we have νit ∼ N
(
0, σ2e/(1− ρ2)
)
by
equation (2.7). Let B = IN − δW , θ2 = σ
2
µ
σ2e
, α =
√
1+ρ
1−ρ , d
2 = (ιαT )
′ιαT with ι
α
T = (α, ι
′
T−1), and
4The codes are modified from the Matlab code provided by Dr. Elhorst, which is for the random effects
model with spatial autocorrelation and available at: http://www.regroningen.nl/irios.html, last visited
08/20/2008.
21
assign ιT as a vector of ones of dimension T . The log-likelihood function for the panel data
regression model can be written as5
l(β, σ2e , δ, ρ, θ
2) = −NT
2
ln(2piσ2e) +
1
2
N ln(1− ρ2)− 1
2
N∑
i=1
ln
(
1 + d2(1− ρ)2θ2(1− δwi)2
)
+T
N∑
i=1
ln(1− δwi)− 12σ2e
T∑
t=1
e∗∗
′
t e
∗∗
t (2.8)
where e∗∗t = y∗∗t −X∗∗t β, and
y∗∗t = Py
∗
α +B(y
∗
t − y∗α) = (IN − δW )y∗t + (Py∗α − (IN − δW )y∗α)
X∗∗t = (IN − δW )X∗t +
(
PX
∗
α − (IN − δW )X∗α
)
(2.9)
Here, wi is the ith characteristic root of W , y∗α is the “α” average of yt, i.e., y∗α = y
′
t× ιαT /(α+
T−1), and X∗α is similarly defined. P is such that P ′P =
(
d2(1− ρ)2θ2IN + (B′B)−1
)−1. Here
P = Λ−
1
2R, where R is an N×N matrix in which the ith column is the characteristic vector ri
of
(
d2(1− ρ)2θ2IN + (B′B)−1
)−1. Note that ri is the same as the characteristic vector of the
spatial weight matrix W . And Λ is an N ×N diagonal matrix with the ith diagonal element
being ci = d2(1− ρ)2θ2 + 1/(1− δwi)2.
Estimates of β and σ2e are then solved as follows:
βˆ =
(
X∗∗
′
X∗∗
)−1 (
X∗∗
′
y∗∗
)
and σˆ2e =
N∑
i=1
e∗∗
′
t e
∗∗
t /NT (2.10)
Substituting βˆ and σˆ2e into log-likelihood function (2.8), the concentrated log-likelihood func-
tion of δ, ρ and θ2 is obtained:
l(δ, ρ, θ2) = Constant− NT
2
ln
(
T∑
t=1
e∗∗
′
t e
∗∗
t
)
− 1
2
N∑
i=1
ln
(
1 + d2(1− ρ)2θ2(1− δwi)2
)
+
1
2
N ln(1− ρ2) + T
N∑
i=1
ln(1− δwi) (2.11)
In summary, the estimation procedure is as follows: (1) Choose the initial values of δ, ρ
and θ2 in the specified ranges; (2) Given δ, ρ and θ2, solve for βˆ from equation (2.10), which
is the generalized least square (GLS) estimator of β; (3) Substitute the βˆ obtained in step 2
5See Baltagi et al. (2007) and Elhorst (2003) for details on a very similar derivation.
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into equation (2.11), then use optimization techniques to obtain maximum likelihood estimates
(MLE) of δ, ρ and θ2; (4) Iterate between step 2 and step 3 until results satisfy a predetermined
convergence criterion.
Price Data Selection
Before we get into discussion of the estimation results, one point that needs to be made clear
concerns why we use average April futures price as expected output price in our estimation. The
actual cash rental rates data collection happens in spring (April) while most rental contracts
are entered into in late summer (August) of the previous year. In the annual cash rental rates
survey, experts are asked to provide information about “current typical” cash rental rates
in their counties. Rental contracts are sometimes renegotiated after major price movements.
What happens is that the landowner and tenant farmer sometimes agree to wait until after
January to set the rent in the event that prices rise significantly after September 1st. It is not
clear whether the experts answer the question with reference to prior August rental agreements
or to the market environment pertaining at the time of the survey response.
In order to further determine the information content of cash rental rates data, we follow
the idea of a comprehensive specification test (Greene 2003, p. 154). In our case, Model 1 is
the model using average year t April price for the year t harvest futures contract price, while
Model 0 uses average year t−1 August price for the year t harvest contract price. Other model
specifications are the same as the variable profit function structure in equation (2.4).
In the unrestricted model, we assume that the actual price in forming the expected output
price takes the form of a weighted average of April and August prices, as κ ln(pApr) + (1 −
κ) ln(pAug). Here, pApr and pAug are the average April price in year t and August price in year
t − 1, respectively, and κ is a weight between 0 and 1. Model 0 assumes κ = 0 and Model 1
assumes κ = 1. We use the concentrated log-likelihood function (2.11) to find the maximum
likelihood estimate of κ using grid search. This is a simplified estimation method since κ cannot
be estimated separately from other parameters in equation (2.11). The maximum likelihood
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estimate of κ is 0.95.6 Applying the likelihood ratio test (Greene 2003, p. 152), we get the
value of the χ2-statistic as 0.56 with P > χ21 = 0.55 and fail to reject κ = 1. This means that
model 1 is the appropriate model for the estimation. Estimates of the parameters in equation
(2.4) are given in table 2.1. The parameter estimates for the nume´raire output, soybeans, are
derived using the symmetry and homogeneity constraints in equations (2.2)-(2.3).
Analysis of Estimation Results
From the estimation results, the coefficients of spatial autocorrelation (δ), temporal autocor-
relation (ρ), and the fraction of variance due to unobservable effects (θ2) are all statistically
significant at the 1% level, which confirms our model specification tests. Furthermore, the
point estimate of spatial autocorrelation is 0.73 and highly significant. This indicates the
existence of important spatial dependencies in the data. The point estimate of the temporal
autocorrelation is 0.42 and is also highly significant. This confirms the existence of time-lagged
behavior in farmland rental agreements.
All the coefficients of region-specific factors have intuitively correct signs. As expected,
livestock density, normalized distance to metropolitan areas, adoption rate of GE crops, and
expected government subsidies all significantly affect the local cash rental rates. In addition,
livestock density, GE crops’ adoption, and expected government subsidies considerably increase
what tenant farmers pay to landowners. The urbanization effect is estimated as -0.54 and is
highly significant. This indicates that farmland rents are higher for counties closer to big
metropolitan areas. The estimated coefficient of ethanol production effect is very small and
not significant, which means that production of ethanol plants in Iowa have not been found
to have a strong local effect on cash rental rates. We have already included national futures
prices as expected output prices, accounting for the global effect of ethanol production. So
ethanol production impacts local farmland rental markets mainly through the national futures
price.
At the adoption rate level of 2007, the total effect of GE adoption on land rent is about
6The detailed grid search results for κ are in the Appendix.
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$14.19. According to Duffy (2007), compared with non-herbicide tolerant soybeans, total cost
savings from labor, fertilizer, and pesticide (but not machinery) of herbicide tolerant soybeans
is about $11.30. But seed cost of the GE soybeans is $10 higher per acre, which indicates that
by utilizing market power to charge higher seed prices, seed companies benefit in the division
of land rent. Evaluated at the sample means, the impact of $1 government payment on cash
rents is about $0.08.7
Furthermore, evaluated at the sample means of all related variables, the marginal effect
of soil quality, represented by CSR, is $2.11, which means that cash rent increases by about
$2 with one more CSR point. For relative location, represented by B, the marginal effect
is about -$0.39, which indicates that counties locating further west and north tend to have
slightly lower cash rent levels. The estimated yields of corn and soybeans implied by the profit
function are 50 bushels and 18 bushels per acre, respectively.8 By the RRT, in which the
response of cash rents to a marginal increase in corn price is equal to the estimated yield in
quantity, the current period cash rent increase corresponding to a $1 increase in corn price is
also about $50. Some reflection on the economic foundations of this response is warranted.
Perhaps a change in output price should have both short- and long-term effects on cash rental
rates. In other words, past changes in corn prices should affect present cash rental rates, but
the incidence of the effects may be distributed across several future time periods. While higher
corn prices drive up the local cash rental rates, contract re-negotiation in local markets may
exhibit inertia due to community ties, relationship-specific investments (RSIs), and market
power issues.
Because the process of contract enforcement is typically difficult and costly, enduring per-
sonal relationships and community ties are sometimes important for landlords when selecting
tenants. It is also well recognized in the literature that RSIs are positively related with contract
duration, especially for fixed cash rent contracts (e.g., Joskow 1987; Bandiera 2005; Jacoby
and Mansuri 2006; Yoder et al. 2008). Among the four types of RSIs recognized in Williamson
7We will discuss total long-term impact of government subsidies in a later section.
8These yields are much lower than typical Iowa yields. We will discuss implications of the disparity at a later
juncture.
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(1983), non-salvageable physical specific assets and human specific assets are most relevant to
farmland rental markets. Tenant farmers may make investments in equipment and machinery
that are specific to the rented land and may lose values in alternative uses. Some human
capital investments, such as learning about capabilities of given land, are tied to specific land
and cannot be easily transferred to another landlord-tenant relationship. There are similar
RSIs on the landlord side as well. Thus, the landlord and tenant farmer more likely prefer a
longer-term contract and may be reluctant to repeatedly negotiate leasing contracts over time.
So the adjustment of cash rental rates to long-run equilibrium is expected be a long-term
process, which is the topic we turn to in the next section.
Long-run Effect Analysis
In this section, the parameter of interest is the average long-run effect of expected corn price
and government subsidies on cash rental rates. An error correction model (ECM) is used to
estimate the long-run effect. The ECM is a class of models with a general form equivalent to
the traditional autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models (Greene 2003, p. 579). We are
going to look at two dimensions of the relationship between cash rental rates and expected
corn prices or government subsidies: the long-run effect; and the potentially heterogeneous,
dynamic adjustment path for each county. To be consistent with what we have done above, we
consider the long-run effect by analyzing the relationship between cash rental rates and corn
futures prices or government subsidies where all of them are normalized by the corresponding
soybean futures prices over the period of 1987-2007.
There are two commonly used estimation procedures in the literature for applying panel
data to obtain long-run effects. The first one is the mean group (MG) estimator, which was
proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995). The MG procedure is to obtain a distinct regression
estimate for each group or county in our case, and then average the coefficients over all groups to
obtain the average effect. Pesaran and Smith (1995) showed that the MG estimation produces
consistent estimates of the average of the parameters. The second procedure is referred to as
pooled mean group (PMG) estimation, and was introduced in Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999).
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It allows the intercepts, short-run coefficients, and error variances to differ across groups but
constrains the long-run multipliers to be the same. It is proved that under some regularity
assumptions, both MG and PMG estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal for both
stationary and non-stationary regressors.
In the ECM, the error correction rate, the short-run effect, and their standard errors are
estimated directly. The long-term multiplier can also be easily calculated. More importantly,
the long-run equilibrium relationships between cash rental rates and expected corn price or
government subsidy can be justified to be the same across all counties, because of similar
climatological conditions, contiguous locations, and technology spillovers affecting them in
analogous ways. The individual adjustment path of each county to the long-run equilibrium
may differ considerably because of county-specific factors. For example, counties with better-
quality farmland and those closer to a big metropolitan area may tend to adjust quicker
and more completely to price changes. While imposing the same long-run multipliers, PMG
estimation allows for variability among short-run coefficients. This structure in turn allows the
dynamic specification, including the individual lag structure, to differ across counties. The MG
estimation doesn’t impose any parameter constraint, allowing all parameters to vary freely.
Following Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999), we formulate the fixed effects panel data model
in the error correction representation as
4yit = αiyi,t−1 + βixi,t−1 +
p−1∑
j=1
γij4yi,t−j +
q−1∑
j=0
λij4xi,t−j + µi + εit (2.12)
where t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}, and i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}; yit and xit are the dependent variable and explana-
tory variable for county i at time t; 4yit = yit−yi,t−1, 4xit = xit−xi,t−1, 4yi,t−j and 4xi,t−j
are j period lagged values of yit and xit; and µi represents the fixed effect. The disturbances εit
are assumed to be independently distributed across i and t with mean 0 and variance σ2i > 0.
In our case the dependent variable, yit, is the normalized cash rental rate of county i at time
t and xit is the normalized corn futures price or one-year lagged government payment over t.
There is no cross-sectional variation in futures prices data.
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The long-run relationship between yit and xit can be defined by
yit = θixit + νit, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}
where θi = − βiαi are the long-run coefficients, and νit is assumed to be a stationary process.
Equation (2.12) can be rewritten as
4yit = αiνi,t−1 +
p−1∑
j=1
γij4yi,t−j +
q−1∑
j=0
λij4xi,t−j + µi + εit (2.13)
where νi,t−1 is the error correction term, hence, αi is the error correction coefficient measuring
the adjustment speed toward the long-run equilibrium.
By imposing the long-run homogeneity constraint, θi = θ, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, PMG estimation
constrains the long-run coefficients to be the same. The pooled maximum likelihood estima-
tion is applied for parameter estimation. Derivation and computation details are provided in
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999).9 Because of the linear nature of (2.12), we can obtain the
PMG estimators by
αˆPMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
α˜i, βˆPMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
β˜i, γˆjPMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
γ˜ij , j ∈ {1, 2, ..., p− 1},
λˆjPMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
λ˜ij , j ∈ {0, 1, ..., q − 1}, θˆPMG = θ˜.
The MG estimation allows for heterogeneity among all the parameters in incorporating
county-specific long-run and short-run effects. The estimates of the parameters are as follows:
αˆMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
αˆi, βˆMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
βˆi, γˆjMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
γˆij , j ∈ {1, 2, ..., p− 1},
λˆjMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
λˆij , j ∈ {0, 1, ..., q − 1}, θˆMG = 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
− βˆi
αˆi
)
.
where αˆi, βˆi, γˆij , and λˆij are the OLS estimates for an individual county using (2.12).
The lag order was first chosen for each county on the unrestricted model by using the Akaike
information criterion (AIC),10 subject to a maximum lag of 3. Then, the long-run homogeneity
9The codes are modified from the Gauss code provided in the paper. Available at: http://www.econ.cam.
ac.uk/faculty/pesaran, last visited 08/20/2008.
10Using Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC), we get similar results. In some cases, because of SBC’s heavier
penalty for lost degrees of freedom, it will lead to a simpler model than AIC (Greene 2003, p. 565).
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constraint was imposed using these AIC-determined lag orders. Table 2.2 shows the MG and
PMG estimation results. The results for individual counties of two sets of regressions are not
reported because of limited space. They are all statistically significant. All estimates, MG and
PMG, of the long-run multipliers, the error correction coefficient and short-run coefficient are
all significant. For the ECM model of cash rents and corn price, the estimates are different
to some extent, while for expected government payments, all estimated coefficients are quite
similar.
Figure 2.4 reports long-run effects of expected corn prices obtained from the MG estima-
tion procedure over sample counties. It demonstrates that significant long-run price effects
are present in most of the counties, and they vary considerably across the state. Also, the
distribution of the long-run effects is in line with that of historical cash rental rates. This ob-
servation is confirmed by the OLS regression results reported in table 2.3, which suggests that
the county cash rental rate for 2007 is highly significant in explaining the variation of long-run
price effects. It may be that long-run effects and historical cash rental rates are related in some
way to counties’ specific factors.
Adjustment speeds, represented by the error correction coefficients, are obtained from the
PMG estimation procedure with range from 0.38 to 1. In some counties, the error correction
coefficients are 1 since the model selection criterion chooses the static model as the best-fitting
model. A full adjustment speed of 1 means that cash rents will adjust to long-run equilibrium
instantaneously. The regression results in table 2.3 implicate higher soil quality, which is
statistically significant at the 1% level, as a factor in explaining heterogeneity in speeds of
adjustment. These results lend some support to the hypothesis that sluggish responses to
price movement are due to thinner cropland rental markets, where good land is comparatively
scarce.
In general, changes in the corn price have both short-term and long-term effects on cash
rental rates. In the long run, the possible size of the changes in cash rental rates will be
approximately $103-$112, which could be reached in three to four years. The adjustment
speed and corresponding dynamic adjustment path to the long-run equilibrium vary across the
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state and depend mainly on the average soil quality of cropland in a specific county. As shown
in figure 2.5, following the price shock at year t, the simultaneous increase is about $85-94, $15
increase in year t + 1, $2 in year t + 2, and so on. Similarly, as indicated by the estimation
results in table 2.2, the long-term pass-through of $1 government payment into cash rental
rates is about $0.56-$0.61 while the short-run effect is about $0.30-$0.44.
However, we note that the average yield in Iowa over the 1987-2007 period is 140 bushels
per acre. The RRT suggests that the long-run equilibrium level corresponding to $1 increase
of corn price should be around $140. It is about $30 more than our long-run effect estimation.
To formally test the validity of RRT, we apply the likelihood ratio test on PMG long-run effect
estimator. The restricted log likelihood changes from -3265.0984 to -3401.7410 after further
restricting the common long-run effect to be $140. The corresponding likelihood ratio statistic
is 273.29. Since the computed value is larger than the critical value of χ2 distribution with
one degree of freedom, 3.842, the hypothesis of the long-run effect being $140 is rejected at 1%
significance level.
Besides estimation error, the price and income supports farmers obtained from U.S. agri-
cultural programs may explain part of this disparity. When the effect of a downward corn
price movement is eliminated by government support through a price floor, then cash rents
should respond to an increase in corn price only when it is above a certain level. Also, the
questionable bargaining power assumption underlying the RRT may provide us with another
explanation for incomplete long-run responses. In addition to landlords and tenant farmers,
seed suppliers may have some degree of bargaining power in the division of cash rents. Pri-
vate seed companies are typically well protected by patents, licenses, and other intellectual
property rights. These protections, and also seed industry concentration, may have enabled
seed companies to capture the benefits of their innovation through prices (Jolly and Lence
2000). In other words, continuing adoption of GE corn and soybeans may have conferred seed
companies with significant bargaining power, and seed companies may be able to appropriate
some farmland cash rents. So lack of consideration for the role that seed suppliers may play is
perhaps another reason why the estimated long-run response in rent to a $1 increase in corn
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price is only about 0.80 of what RRT suggests.
Conclusion
In this study, we conduct a short-run and long-run analysis of determination of cropland cash
rental rates in Iowa over 1987-2007. The results indicate that the adjustment of cash rental
rates to long-run equilibrium is heterogeneous across counties and has a long-term dynamic
process, which is possibly linked to local specific factors such as farmland soil quality. The
total effects of marginal output price change and government subsidy are analyzed and the
validity of Ricardian rent theory is tested.
We have three remarks about future possible extensions to our study. First, the behavior of
participants in the division of farmland cash rents can be investigated as a cooperative games.
Landlord, tenant farmer, and seed supplier come together to bargain over the surplus, cash
rents. Cash rents can be assumed to be divided among them according to the Shapley value
(Shapley 1953), which defines the payoff to each individual participant based on his marginal
contribution to the surplus. The Shapley value measures bargaining power in this allocation
game and pins down the magnitude of rent that each player will receive in the bargaining
process. It would allow us to better understand the equilibrium impact of rapidly changing
biotechnology on land rents. Our analysis also indicates that this important factor bears
further scrutiny.
Another possible extension is to break out a real option component to land rents. After
signing a rental agreement in August the previous year, a tenant farmer has the flexibility to
switch his planting intention between corn and soybeans. Hence, output futures prices, price
volatilities, and price correlations will affect a farmer’s planting decision and his willingness to
pay for land rents. This real option analysis could help us better understand the determinants
of cash rents. Finally, there is the issue of institutional price floors such as the U.S. commodity
loan rate program. While the U.S. target price program was terminated in 1996, the loan rate
program has been renewed in the 2008 Farm Bill. One can test for asymmetric responses of
cash rental rates to corn price when the price is above or below a government price floor.
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Appendix
A.1. Missing Data Information
County Missing Years County Missing Years
Data included in the study (83 counties)
Adams 1994 Audubon 1988
Calhoun 1993 Cherokee 1994
Clarke 1989,92,94,95,98 Crawford 1998
Decatur 1993 Dubuque 1995
Fremont 1987,88,89 Ida 1993
Iowa 1995 Jones 1995
Mills 1987 Monona 1993,94,95
O’Brien 1994 Palo Alto 1987,88
Plymouth 1994 Poweshiek 1995
Sac 1993 Taylor 1989,94
Union 1995 Woodbury 1993,94,95
Data not included (16 counties)
Appanoose 1987-96 Davis 1987-92,94,96
Des Moines 1987-92,94-96 Henry 1987-92,94,96
Jefferson 1987-92,94-96 Keokuk 1987-92,94-96
Lee 1987-92,95-96 Louisa 1987-91,94-96
Lucas 1987-92,94-96 Marion 1987-92,94
Mahaska 1987-92,94-95 Monroe 1987-92,94-96
Van Buren 1987-92,94,96 Wapello 1987-92,94-96
Washington 1987-91,94-96 Wayne 1987-92,96
Note: The missing data for the included counties are linearly interpo-
lated using Matlab. We exclude the counties that have missing data
for five or more continuous years. The 16 counties are excluded also
because they are spatially contiguous in the southeast corner of Iowa.
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A.2. Grid Search Result for Price Selection
κ Log-likelihood κ Log-likelihood
0 1230.55 0.5 1313.21
0.8 1351.98 0.9 1355.14
0.94 1355.42 0.95 1355.43
0.96 1355.41 1 1355.15
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Table 2.1 Estimates of the Random Effects Model
Explanatory Variables Parameter Asymp. t-stat. Z-Value
1 Constant 1.47 0.62 0.54
2 ln(Corn price) 2.20 2.35 0.02
3 ln(Fertilizer price) -0.71 -1.78 0.08
4 12 ln(Corn price)
2 1.01 1.25 0.21
5 ln(Corn price)× ln(Fertilizer price) -2.46 -8.29 < 0.001
6 12 ln(Fertilizer price)
2 -3.51 -8.94 < 0.001
7 CSR 0.05 0.95 0.34
8 B 0.10 1.13 0.26
9 12(CSR)
2 -0.00034 -0.59 0.55
10 12B
2 0.00087 0.35 0.72
11 CSR×B -0.0012 -1.35 0.18
12 ln(Corn price)× CSR 0.000088 0.019 0.98
13 ln(Corn price)×B -0.0026 -0.21 0.84
14 ln(Fertilizer price)× CSR 0.002 0.84 0.39
15 ln(Fertilizer price)×B 0.0049 0.76 0.45
16 ln(Corn price)× t 0.099 5.88 < 0.001
17 ln(Fertilizer price)× t 0.15 9.95 < 0.001
18 CSR× t -0.00044 -3.09 0.002
19 B × t -0.00067 -1.72 0.09
20 t 0.12 4.85 < 0.001
21 t2 -0.015 -18.71 < 0.001
22 Scale of livestock industry 0.054 2.38 0.02
23 Ethanol plant effect 0.000038 0.13 0.90
24 Urbanization effect -0.54 -10.60 < 0.001
25 Adoption of GE crops 0.93 18.83 < 0.001
26 Expected subsidies 0.0040 5.04 < 0.001
27 θ2 0.66 8.94 < 0.001
28 δ 0.73 35.90 < 0.001
29 ρ 0.42 15.85 0.001
R2 0.9870
adjusted R2 0.9868
Number of cross-sections 83
Number of years 21
Total number of observations 1743
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Table 2.2 Estimates of the Error Correction Model
Corn price change Subsidy
Parameter MG PMG MG PMG
Long-run multiplier 111.86 (3.07) 103.29 (2.04) 0.557 (0.020) 0.613 (0.022)
Error correction coefficient -0.85 (0.025) -0.82 (0.027) -0.71 (0.032) -0.71 (0.033)
Short-run coefficient 93.87 (3.53) 84.70 (2.74) 0.44 (0.020) 0.36 (0.012)
Note: standard error is in the parenthesis.
Table 2.3 Estimates of Long-run Effect (MG) and Adjustment Speed (PMG)
Long Run Effect Adjustment Speed
Explanatory Variables Parameter t-stat. Z-Value Parameter t-stat. Z-Value
Constant 280.97 3.72 < 0.001 0.76 1.22 0.23
Rent 2007 0.42 1.79 0.08 -0.0075 -3.82 < 0.001
CSR -2.12 -3.48 0.001 0.021 4.24 < 0.001
B -1.74 -1.23 0.22 0.047 4.00 < 0.001
Urbanization effect -0.77 -2.20 0.03 -0.012 -4.29 < 0.001
R2 0.3257 0.3158
adjusted R2 0.2911 0.2807
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Figure 2.1 Cash Rental Rates, 2007 ($/acre/year)
Figure 2.2 County Average Row Crop CSR Index
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Figure 2.3 Ethanol Plants in Operation, 2007
Figure 2.4 Long-run Effects (MG)
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Figure 2.5 MG/PMG Estimates of Dynamic Adjustments
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3. THE PLANTING REAL OPTION IN CASH RENT VALUATION
Abstract
After entering into a farmland rental contract in the fall, a tenant farmer has the flexibility over
the spring crop choice and the input application level. Failure to account for these options will
bias estimates of what farmers should pay to rent land. Applying contingent claims analysis
methods, this study explicitly derives the option value function for these choices. Comparative
statics with respect to the volatilities of underlying state variables and their correlations are
derived and discussed. A multivariate Gaussian copula is employed to account for dependence
among yields and prices. Monte Carlo simulation results show that the average cash rent
valuation for the real option approach is 13.5% higher than that for the conventional net
present value (NPV) method, in which the input intensity option is 0.47%. Crop planting
sequence is shown to impact the real option value.
Key words: cash rent, Gaussian copula, Monte Carlo simulation, Ricardian rent.
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Introduction
Cropland rental rates have adjusted substantially over the period 2005-08 (Edwards and Smith
2008). This has largely been due to price shifts arising from demand for corn as an ethanol
plant feedstock. Landlords and tenants have needed to re-evaluate their willingness to pay
and accept rents in this new environment. The goal of this paper is to provided a better
understanding of willingness to pay for rented cropland.
In the United States, tenant farmers generally rent cropland in the fall to prepare for spring
planting. Cash rent is an important feature of midwestern crop production. In Iowa, as an
example, about 40% of cropland is rented under cash rental agreements. Our contention is
that the fall to spring time gap is important for how cash renters value access to land as
commodity prices can move substantially over this period. The standard cash rent calculation
method suggested by farm management textbooks (e.g., Calkins and DiPietre 1983, p. 394;
Olson 2004, p. 285; Kay, Edwards, and Duffy 2004, p. 359) is the so-called tenant’s residual
approach. The method is to derive a residual, or Ricardian rent, for land by deducting operating
costs from crop revenue based on expected yields, prices, and operating expenses. After taking
into account planting decisions faced by a farmer who chooses between corn and soybeans,
the traditional net present value (NPV) method calculates the present value of expected corn
cash flows and also the present value of expected soybeans cash flows. The maximum value
of this pair of present values is then used to determine cash rent. The major drawback of the
conventional NPV method as applied to cash rent valuation is that it ignores the option to
choose what to plant. Thus, it underestimates what farmers should be willing to pay for rental
land.
Like other investment decisions, farmer’s production intentions with rented land share
three distinct features of real options, as described in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). One is
irreversibility. Once the crop has been planted, related sunk costs cannot be fully recovered.
Another is uncertainty. Profit uncertainty is due to stochastic output, as well as time-varying
input and output prices. The third feature is leeway in timing. After entering into a farmland
rental agreement, a tenant farmer has an extensive margin flexibility to “switch” between corn
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and soybeans for the next crop year. He also has an intensive margin flexibility concerning the
level of inputs to apply at planting. We refer to the total value of these two real options as the
planting real option in this study. And these options mature at the planting time.
The impacts of irreversibility, uncertainty and the choice of timing on investment project
decisions and valuation have been widely recognized and applied to various investment prob-
lems in agriculture. For example, Tzouramani and Mattas (2004) employ the real option
approach to better assess investment opportunities when compared with the NPV approach.
Odening, Mußhoff, and Balmann (2005) calculate investment triggers and option values when
accounting for the value of waiting for an investment in hog fattening in Germany. Luong
and Tauer (2006) model Vietnamese coffee growers’ entry and exit decisions as real options.
Mußhoff and Hirschauer (2008) apply the dynamic programming and simulation methods to
sales contracting decision problems facing German grain farmers. The most relevant applica-
tion to our work is Marcus and Modest (1984). They applied continuous time option pricing
methods to solve a farmer’s optimal production decision problem. Crop futures prices are used
as the stochastic state variables that characterize the uncertainty faced by farmers.
The value of a tenant farmer’s potential planting flexibility, which should be reflected in
cash rent determination, is largely driven by volatile input and output prices. Failure to
account for option values will bias estimates of what farmers should pay to rent land. The
literature on farmland cash rent determination is surprisingly limited and the embedded real
option component is entirely ignored. Kurkalova, Burkart, and Secchi (2004), for example,
estimate the cash rental rate as a function of the typical corn yield in the Upper Mississippi
River Basin in 1997. Dhuyvetter and Kastens (2002) use an accounting approach to model
cash rents. Lence and Mishra (2003) and Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magne´ (2004) develop
regressions of cash rents against crop revenues and government payments in order to better
understand the role of government interventions. Du, Hennessy, and Edwards (2007) employ
a variable profit function Ricardian rent approach to analyze the determinants of cash rents
using Iowa county-level panel data. None of these seeks to model planting time flexibility.
Contrary to the traditional NPV method, in this study, we explicitly derive the value of
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the switching and input intensity options. Using historical cash prices, as well as experimental
production data, and employing a Gaussian copula to account for the multivariate dependence,
we evaluate the option, i.e., flexibility, values by Monte Carlo methods. Our contributions to
the literature on cash rent will be to identify the existence and importance of the planting
option in cash rent determination.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, a conceptual model of real option valuation is devel-
oped. Comparative statics of the switching option with respect to volatilities and correlation
of underlying state variables are derived and discussed. Second, an empirical Monte Carlo
simulation method is described. Copula estimation and simulation methods for random in-
put and output prices and crop yields are presented. The estimation focuses on the option’s
contribution to cash rent. The final section concludes with a brief discussion.
Conceptual Model
In Iowa, corn is typically planted between April 20 and May 10 each year. The best planting
time for soybeans is from May 15 to June 1. Crops are harvested from October to November of
the same year. After signing a farmland rental contract, typically in August the previous year,
a tenant farmer makes planting and input choice decisions in April. When making planting
decisions, farmers observe and use price information from the futures contracts expiring right
after harvest time to formulate harvest price expectations. When deciding what can be paid for
rented land, farmers will use futures prices to establish what they may plant, how intensively
they will farm, and the value of what they will reap. On the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT),
the December contract for corn and the November contract for soybeans are the first available
futures contracts after harvest time. The time line is as follows:
Apr. May Jun. Oct.
Plant Corn
Plant Soybean Harvest
T0 T1 T2
Aug.
Sign Contract
Nov. Dec.
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where T0 is the time when a tenant farmer signs the farmland rental contract, T1 is the time
when the planting and input decisions are made, and T2 is the harvest time. In addition, time
t ∈ [T0, T2] is the continuous time indicator.
NPV vs. Real Option Methods
The traditional NPV approach assumes that a tenant farmer makes the planting decision
when agreeing on the cash rent. When corn and soybeans are the crops that may be chosen,
a tenant farmer compares expected corn profit, Et(piC) = Et[ET1(piC)], with that of soybeans,
Et(piS) = Et[ET1(piS)]. Et[·] denotes the expectation operator conditional on information
available at time t under the risk-neutral measure. Expectations ET1(piC) and ET1(piS) are
expected harvest time corn and soybean profits at planting time T1. The present value of
Et(piC) and Et(piS) are obtained from discounting the expected profits back to the decision-
making time t by risk-free rate r. In the standard NPV approach to rent determination, the
planting choice is implicitly assumed to have been made with certainty by time t where t < T1.1
A tenant farmer plants the crop with higher present value of expected profit, which is also the
amount of cash rent paid out to the landowner and is calculated as
V1 = e−r(T2−t) max {Et(piC), Et(piS)} (Traditional approach) (3.1)
Contrast this approach with the real option method, in which a tenant farmer is assumed
to have the flexibility to switch between corn and soybeans until the planting time. The
corresponding cash rent valuation taking into account the real option value is
V2 = e−r(T2−t)Et [max(piC , piS)] (Real option approach) (3.2)
Here, the planting choice is not made until time T1. It’s readily shown that V1 ≤ V2 is true by
Jensen’s inequality. Also, at maturity, the real option payoff is
ET1 {max(piC , piS)} −max {ET1(piC), ET1(piS)} (3.3)
1The traditional approach also ignores intensive margin planting time flexibility in input use. It identifies an
expected profit at T0, not allowing for flexibility in waiting for knowledge of FT1,i, i ∈ {C, S} to choose input
levels for each given crop (Oi 1961).
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with the strike price being max {ET1(piC), ET1(piS)}. In general, the smaller the difference
between corn and soybean expected profits, the higher the real option premium will be. The
switching option will have little value if the profit from one crop is almost certain to dominate
those from all other crops.
In this study, the planting option is further decomposed to include the switching option
described above and the input intensity option. We only consider value of the input intensity
option embedded in corn profit, in which the nitrogen price is explicitly included. The corn
profit taking into account the input intensity option value is V3 = e−r(T2−t)Et(piC,N∗), while
V4 = e−r(T2−t)Et(piC,N ) represents the traditional corn profit. Nitrogen application level N∗
in V3 is determined by expected price information at planting time T1. The level of N in V4
is decided at T0, the sign-up time for rental contracts. Since N∗ is conditioned on the actual
nitrogen price and a more informed signal on harvest price for corn, it follows that V3 ≥ V4
and a budget approach that assumes the nitrogen choice at contract sign-up will undervalue
rent.
Real Option Valuation
The option of choosing between corn and soybeans is equivalent to an option to exchange one
risky asset for another. Values of the crops are assumed to be the two assets to be exchanged
and can be derived using contingent claim analysis methods as developed in Black and Scholes
(1973), Merton (1973, 1977), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
Write the time t expected corn and soybean prices at harvest time T2 as Ft,C and Ft,S ,
and write the time t nitrogen fertilizer price at planting time T1 as Ft,N . To promote precise
notation, futures maturity date T2 has been suppressed. All are held to follow geometric
Brownian motions as
dFt,i
Ft,i
= µFt,idt+ σFt,idzi i ∈ {C, S,N}. (3.4)
over t ∈ [T0, T1] where µFt,i is the instantaneous expected rate of return, σ2Ft,i is the volatility
of the expected price, and dzi follows a Wiener process. In addition, ρCS , ρCN , and ρSN are
used in this study to denote the instantaneous correlations between the Wiener processes dzC
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and dzS , dzC and dzN , dzS and dzN , respectively.
The soybean futures price, Ft,S , is considered to be the only stochastic state variable
determining the value of soybean profit, V St (Ft,S), at time t. This is because nitrogen is
seldom applied on soybeans. The corn and nitrogen fertilizer futures prices, Ft,C and Ft,N ,
are considered to be the stochastic state variables driving the changes of corn crop value.
Following Marcus and Modest (1984), it is shown in the appendix that the corn and soybean
value functions, V Ct (·) and V St (·), are determined by time, futures prices, price volatilities and
correlations, as well as production technology. Cobb-Douglas cost functions are assumed to
represent the corn and soybean production technologies with parameters δC , δS , and δN .
Following Margrabe (1978), in the appendix the value of the switching option is shown as
Π
(
V C , V S , t
)
= V Ct Φ(d1)− V St Φ(d2) ≥ 0
d1 =
ln(V Ct /V
S
t ) +
1
2σ
2
V (T1 − t)
σV
√
T1 − t
; d2 = d1 − σV
√
T1 − t
σ2V = δ
2
Cσ
2
Ft,C
+ δ2Sσ
2
Ft,S
+ δ2Nσ
2
Ft,N
+2δCδNσFt,CσFt,NρCN − 2δCδSσFt,CσFt,SρCS − 2δSδNσFt,SσFt,NρSN
=
(
δC δS −δN
)
σ2Ft,C σFt,C ,Ft,S σFt,C ,Ft,N
σFt,C ,Ft,S σ
2
Ft,S
σFt,S ,Ft,N
σFt,C ,Ft,N σFt,S ,Ft,N σ
2
Ft,N


δC
δS
−δN

≥ 0 (3.5)
where σFt,C ,Ft,S = σFt,CσFt,SρCS is the covariance between Ft,C and Ft,S , and σFt,C ,Ft,N as well
as σFt,S ,Ft,N are similarly defined. The cdf of standard normal distribution is Φ(·).
Comparative Statics of the Switching Option
The comparative statics of the switching option with respect to volatilities of the underlying
price variables, also called the option Vegas, measure how much the option price would change
when the volatility of the underlying state variable changes. Derivations in the appendix
indicate that the effects of changes in the volatility of the state variables, σFt,C , σFt,S , and
σFt,N , on the option value are, in general, ambiguous. The standard result that an increase in
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the volatility of the underlying state variable increases the option value doesn’t hold here. The
situation is more complicated because overall volatility σ2V depends on state variable volatilities
and correlations, as well as technology parameters δi, i ∈ {C, S,N}.
The partial derivatives of the switching option with respect to correlation between un-
derlying price variables are also derived in the appendix. The results show that given price
volatilities σFt,C and σFt,S , a higher correlation between corn and soybean prices leads to a
lower option value. That is, a tenant farmer is less likely to change crop choice and thus the
switching option has less value to him when crop values tend to move up and down together.
Also, given corn and nitrogen price volatilities, σFt,C and σFt,N , a higher correlation between
the input and output prices, ρCN , leads to a more stabilized value of the corn crop. This
in turn reduces the value of the option to exchange the crops as corn profit is less likely to
be deep in the money when compared with soybean profit. Similarly, a higher option value
is associated with an increase in ρSN because changes in the same direction of soybean and
nitrogen prices encourage tenant farmers to switch the planting choice.
Empirical Model
Using local corn, soybean, and nitrogen fertilizer cash prices, and crop production data collected
from controlled experiments, we apply Monte Carlo methods to value the planting and input
intensity options. Income uncertainty faced by a tenant farmer comes from three sets of random
variables. These are output prices, input prices, and crop yields.2 A fundamental feature of
these random variables is that they are correlated. For example, the corn price is correlated
with the soybean price, the nitrogen fertilizer price, and also corn and soybean yields. All
prices and yields are treated as random variables in our simulation. And we explicitly model
their dependence using a multivariate Gaussian copula.
Under the assumption of risk neutrality, the Monte Carlo method involves evaluating the
cash rent implied by the NPV and real option approaches at planting time T1, then discounting
2As no additional insights would be gained from including yield uncertainty in the conceptual model, we
omitted it. We could readily have done so in the manner of Marcus and Modest (1986). The easiest way to do
so is to assume a log-normal yield distribution. But that is not realistic.
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back at the risk-free rate as given by V1 in (3.1) and V2 in (3.2). The corn and soybeans profits
are assumed to be
piT1,C = PT1,CyT1,C − PT1,NN −K
′
C piT1,S = PT1,SyT1,S −KS (3.6)
where PT1,i, i ∈ {C, S} denote the planting time T1 expected local harvest prices, and PT1,N
denotes price of nitrogen fertilizer at time T1. Amount K
′
C is the corn production cost excluding
the cost of nitrogen fertilizer,3 while KS is the soybean production cost. Symbol N denotes
the quantity of nitrogen fertilizer input and yT1,i, i ∈ {C, S} are expected yields of corn and
soybeans, respectively.
The Monte Carlo simulation consists of the following steps:
(a) Based on estimated parameters, simulate the underlying random variables, i.e., generate n
prices of PT1,C , PT1,S , and PT1,N ; generate corn and soybean yields forecasts yT1,C and yT1,S at
planting time T1.
(b) Applying Iowa annual crop production budget data (Duffy and Smith 1979-2008) for
K
′
C and KS and generated quantities in step (a), get n terminal corn and soybean profits,
piiT1,C , pi
i
T1,S
, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n};
(c) Take the average of the discounted final option values under the NPV and real option
approaches to obtain an estimate of these values at time t as
Vˆ1(t) = e−rt(T2−t) max
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
(piiT1,C),
1
n
n∑
i=1
(piiT1,S)
}
Vˆ2(t) = e−rt(T2−t)
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
(
piiT1,C , pi
i
T1,S
)
(3.7)
In addition, Vˆ3(t) = e−rt(T2−t)
{
1
n
∑n
i=1(pi
i
T1,C,N∗)
}
is the corn profit at planting time including
value of the input intensity option where N∗ is conditioned on planting time information. By
contrast, Vˆ4(t) = e−rt(T2−t)
{
1
n
∑n
i=1(pi
i
T1,C,N
)
}
denotes the traditional corn profit where N is
conditioned on sign-up time information.
In step (a) variations of prices and yields are randomly drawn from a 5-dimension mul-
tivariate distribution, which is defined by the five marginal distributions of yield and price
3It is not quite the same as KC of equation (A-1), which includes the cost of nitrogen fertilizer.
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variations, as well as a multivariate Gaussian copula. The expected corn and soybean yields
are obtained from OLS regressions of experimental data after taking into account rotation
effects. The copula estimation and simulation method for yield and price variables are now
discussed in greater detail.
Copula Method
Due in part to its flexibility, the Copula method has recently become a significant tool for
modeling the dependence between two or more variables. For a non-normal multivariate joint
distribution, the dependence structure captured by a copula function is more informative than
linear correlation. Nelsen (1999) provide detailed statistical and mathematical introductions
to copula methods, while Cherubini, Luciano, and Vecchiato (2004) presents applications in
empirical finance and asset pricing. Copula based approaches are applied to model the correla-
tions between crop prices and yields when studying farm and revenue insurance contract in Zhu,
Ghosh, and Goodwin (2008) and in Tejeda and Goodwin (2008). Vedenov (2008) compares
performance of the copula method with other techniques on modeling the joint distribution of
farm and county-level corn yields in Iowa.
By Sklar’s theorem (Sklar, 1959), any h dimensional joint distribution function may be
decomposed into its h marginal distributions, and a h-copula, which completely describes the
dependence between the h random variables. Let X1, ..., Xh be continuous random variables
with distribution function F (x1, ..., xh) and marginal distribution functions F1, ..., Fh, corre-
spondingly. A h-copula is a mapping from the individual distribution functions to the joint
distribution function as
F (x1, ..., xh) = C (F1(x1), ..., Fh(xh)) , for (x1, ..., xh) ∈ [−∞,∞]h. (3.8)
Conversely, if C is an h-copula function and F1, ..., Fh are marginal distribution functions, the
function F defined in (3.8) is a h-dimension distribution function with margins F1, ..., Fh. And
the corresponding copula can be constructed as
C(u1, ..., uh) = F
(
F−11 (u1), ..., F
−1
h (uh)
)
, (3.9)
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where F−1i is the inverse distribution function, i.e., F
−1
i = sup{xi|Fi(xi) ≤ ui}, for i ∈
{1, ..., h}. That is, a copula is a multivariate distribution function with Uniform(0, 1) uni-
variate marginal distributions.
The Gaussian copula is one of the most frequently used parametric families of copula
functions. The multivariate Gaussian copula (MGC) takes the form of
CGa(u1, ..., uh;R) = Φ(F−11 (u1), F
−1
2 (u2), ..., F
−1
h (uh);R) (3.10)
where R is a symmetric, positive definite matrix with diagonal elements of 1’s and Φ(·) is
the multivariate standard normal distribution with correlation matrix R. F−1i represents the
inverse of the univariate distribution Fi. The copula is not constrained by the choice of marginal
distributions, which may take any form of continuous distribution function.
Parameter estimation can proceed as follows. Let β be the vector of marginal distribution
parameters and ρ be the vector of copula’s dispersion parameters, i.e., the elements of corre-
lation matrix R. Given m observations from a multivariate distribution, the parameter vector
to be estimated is θ = (β′, ρ′)′. The corresponding log-likelihood function can be specified as
(Yan 2008):
l(θ) =
m∑
i=1
log c{F1(Xi1;β), ..., Fh(Xih;β); ρ}+
m∑
i=1
h∑
j=1
log fi(Xij ;β);
c(u1, ..., uh) =
f [F−11 (u1), ..., F
−1
h (uh)]∏h
i=1 fi[F
−1
i (ui)]
(3.11)
The maximum likelihood (ML) estimator of θ is θˆ = argmax
θ∈Θ
l(θ).
In this study, there are 20 parameters to estimate, including 10 dispersion parameters for
the 5-dimension MGC, ρi, i ∈ {1, ..., 10}, as in
R =

1 ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4
ρ1 1 ρ5 ρ6 ρ7
ρ2 ρ5 1 ρ8 ρ9
ρ3 ρ6 ρ8 1 ρ10
ρ4 ρ7 ρ9 ρ10 1

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and 10 parameters for the five corresponding marginal univariate distributions. To reduce
the computational difficulty of the optimization problem, we apply the inference functions for
margins (IFM) method of Joe (1997, Ch. 10; 2005) as used in, e.g., Zhu, Ghosh, and Goodwin
(2008) and Tejeda and Goodwin (2008), which consists of two estimation steps:
(a) estimate the marginal distribution parameters β by
βˆIFM = argmax
β
m∑
i=1
h∑
j=1
log fi(Xij ;β) (3.12)
This is equivalent to an ML estimation for parameters βj for each marginal distribution Fj , j =
1, ..., h. as
βˆj,IFM = argmax
βj
m∑
i=1
log fi(Xij ;βj). (3.13)
(b) then estimates the copula parameters ρ given βˆj,IFM by
αˆIFM = argmax
α
m∑
i=1
log c
(
F1(Xi1; βˆj,IFM), ..., Fh(Xih; βˆj,IFM); ρ
)
. (3.14)
Data and Estimation Results
In this study, we model the corn, soybean, and nitrogen price variations, PC , PS , and PN , jointly
with the distributions of corn and soybean yields, yC and yS , by employing a 5-dimension
MGC and five univariate distributions. The marginal distributions are specified as normal for
variations in log of prices and beta for yield variations.
Corn and soybean yields can differ by soil quality, climate, and many other natural factors.
In this study, controlled experimental production data at one location enable us to model corn
yield as a function of time and the input quantity of nitrogen fertilizer, and also soybean yield
as a function of time only. The appropriate distribution for yield variation is still subject to
debate. Just and Weninger (1999) favor for normally distributed crop yields, while Ker and
Goodwin (2000) prefer non-parametric yield density estimation. Ker and Coble (2003) point
out that sufficient yield data are lacking to accept or reject various reasonable parametric
distribution models. The beta distribution is popular in the empirical literature because of the
common view that crop yield distributions can be skewed (Nelson and Preckel 1989), which
is also the reason why we choose the beta distribution to model yield variations. The yield
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variations are OLS regression residuals for corn and soybean yield equations, to be explained
below.
In this study, crop production data are from controlled experiments conducted at Iowa
State University’s Research and Demonstration Farm located in Floyd County, Iowa, from
1979 to 2003 (Mallarino, Ortiz-Torres, and Pecinovsky 2004). The data are collected under
five rotations, 〈C〉, 〈CS〉, 〈CCS〉, 〈CCCS〉, and 〈S〉, where 〈CCCS〉 is to be read as the corn-
corn-corn-soybeans rotation. Four nitrogen levels, 0 lb./ac., 80 lb./ac., 160 lb./ac., and 240
lb./ac. were applied. Each combination of rotation and nitrogen level are replicated three
times in a year. So for each year there are 3 × 4 × (1 + 1 + 2 + 3) = 84 observations for corn
and 3 × 4 × (1 + 1 + 1) = 36 observations for soybeans. There are five combinations of four-
year corn sequences observed in our data, in which the last crop is corn, 〈SCSC〉, 〈CCSC〉,
〈CSCC〉, 〈SCCC〉, and 〈CCCC〉, while we observe three sequences with soybeans the last
crop, 〈CSCS〉, 〈SCCS〉, and 〈CCCS〉.
The corn yield model is specified as
yt,C = αC + βCt+ βNN + βN2N
2 + γCD + εt,C (3.15)
where N is the nitrogen application level, t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T} (T = 25) the time, and εt,C the
random variation. The D is a dummy variable with value 1 when corn is in the sequence of
〈CC〉 and 0 when corn is planted after soybeans. Using the same data set, Hennessy (2006)
find empirical support for one year memory of corn, which indicates that only the 〈CC〉 and
〈CS〉 sequences are distinguishable from each other. Thus D is the only indicator variable
included in (3.15). We combine the data for the crop sequences for corn of 〈SCSC〉 and
〈CCSC〉 and those of 〈CSCC〉, 〈SCCC〉, and 〈CCCC〉 together to apply the OLS regression
model described in (3.15). Soybean production is found to have two-year memory in Hennessy
(2006). So there is no distinction between the yield effects of 〈SCCS〉 and 〈CCCS〉. The
soybean yield model is then
yt,S = αS + βSt+ γSE + εt,S (3.16)
Here, dummy variable E represents the sequence 〈CSCS〉 and εt,S represents the yield varia-
54
tion. The estimation results are presented in table 3.1. The regression results for corn yield
indicate that the yield enhancement effect of corn after soybean relative to corn after corn is
approximately 29.12 bu./ac. And the implied maximum nitrogen level is 212.5 lb./ac., which
is in the reasonable range.
Crop yield, y, is typically assumed to follow a beta distribution with the probability density
function in the form of
f(y) =
Γ(α+ β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
× (y − ymin)
α−1(ymax − y)β−1
yα+β−1max
,
where α and β are shape parameters and ymax and ymin are maximum and minimum possible
yields (Nelson and Preckel 1989). These are the four parameters to estimate. But, as is
standard, the upper and lower supports are imposed. We will estimate these distributions, but
will use the regression residuals from (3.15) and (3.16), εˆt,i, i ∈ {C, S}, and not yields. The
normalized yield variation for year t of crop i is then calculated as ε˜t,i = 1 +
εˆt,i
yˆt,i
where yˆt,i
is the corresponding fitted value of the yield regression. The vector ε˜i has the dimension of
[T × 1] with mean and standard deviation denoted by ε¯i and σε˜i , respectively.
The upper support of ε˜i is imposed as the value of three standard deviations from the
mean, i.e., ε˜i,max = ε¯i + 3σε˜i , while the lower supports ε˜i,min is imposed as 0. The normalized
yield residual ε˜i is then transformed to a standard beta random variable ξ˜ as
ξ˜t,i =
ε˜t,i − ε˜i,min
ε˜i,max − ε˜i,min (3.17)
In addition, ξ˜i is truncated to be in the range of [0, 1] as ξ˜t,i = 1 for ε˜t,i > ε˜i,max. The truncation
is very unlikely to be applied given the range of three standard deviations. The constructed
beta distribution has two shape parameters to be estimated following the IFM estimation
method in (3.13). The estimated shape parameters of corn and soybean yields are presented
in table 3.2, which indicate that both distributions are left skewed.
In order to match with the crop yields specifically estimated from experimental data for
Floyd County, Iowa, monthly average (November for corn and October for soybeans) cash
prices quoted in North Central Iowa from 1979 to 2003 are also used. The interval is chosen to
match the available yield data. The data are reported in the “Daily Historical Grain Report”
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by the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship.4 The difference between the
logarithm of prices in two consecutive years, ζ˜t,i = log(Pt,i) − log(Pt−1,i), is assumed to be
normally distributed. So the crop price is assumed to be distributed as log-normal, which is
a typical assumption in the literature. The mean and variance distribution parameters are
estimated following the IFM method in (3.13) and the results are given in table 3.2. Similarly,
nitrogen fertilizer price is also assumed to be log-normally distributed, the data for which
are obtained from “Estimated Costs of Crop Production in Iowa” (Duffy and Smith 1979-
2008). The estimated parameters are also presented in table 3.2. Finally, price and yield
variations, ξ˜C , ξ˜S , ζ˜C , ζ˜S , and ζ˜N , are used for the estimation of 5-dimension MGC’s dispersion
parameters ρi, i ∈ {1, ..., 10}. The results are given in the second part of table 3.2, and appear
to be reasonable.
The Monte Carlo Simulation
Jointly simulating ξ˜C , ξ˜S , ζ˜C , ζ˜S , and ζ˜N from the multivariate distribution involves generating
random variates from the estimated MGC and transforming the random variates to univariate
random variables. Specifically, as described in Cherubini, Luciano, and Vecchiato (2004, Ch. 6)
the steps for generating one set of random variates are: (a) Simulate h independent random
variates z = (z1, z2, ..., zh)′ from the standard normal distribution N(0, 1). Note that h is
the dimension of the MGC and the multivariate distribution. (b) Generate v = Az where
A is the Cholesky Decomposition of the estimated MGC dispersion matrix Rˆ; (c) Set uj =
Φ(vj), j = 1, 2, ..., h where Φ denotes the univariate N(0, 1) distribution function; (d) Set
xj = F−1j (u
j), j = 1, 2, ..., h where F−1j denotes the inverse of the jth marginal cdf. Repeating
the above procedure, we may obtain n (=5,000 in this study) realizations from the multivariate
distribution of yield and price variations.
There are two sets of prices we need to simulate. One is the expected planting time prices
for corn and nitrogen of year t, P˜t,T1,l, l ∈ {C,N}, which is used to determine the optimal
4The data are obtained from http://www.agriculture.state.ia.us/agMarketing/, last visited 10/12/2008.
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nitrogen level N∗ following
N∗ =
(
P˜t,T1,N − βˆN P˜t,T1,C
)
/2βˆN2P˜t,T1,C (3.18)
The other is expected local harvest prices at planting time of year t, P˜t,T2,l, l ∈ {C, S,N},
which are used in equation (3.6) to compute the expected corn and soybean profits.
Notice that we estimate the marginal distributions of log of harvest time prices as Normal(µˆl, σˆ2l ),
where µˆl and σˆ2l are estimated mean and variance parameters for commodity l. In Iowa, the
crop planting time of year t is approximately half a year before (after) the harvest time of year
t (t− 1). Thus we have (Hull 2002, p. 228)
ln(P˜t,T1,l)− ln(P˜t−1,T2,l) ∼ φ
[
1
2
(µˆl − σˆ
2
l
2
),
1
2
σˆ2l
]
ln(P˜t,T2,l)− ln(P˜t,T1,l) ∼ φ
[
1
2
(µˆl − σˆ
2
l
2
),
1
2
σˆ2l
]
(3.19)
Here, the normal probability density function (pdf) defined in equation (3.19) is the distribution
we need to draw from to obtain random variates of the two sets of prices. So the corresponding
normal cdf is the marginal function applied in the step (d) of the Monte Carlo simulation
procedure. The prices are then transformed as
P˜t,T1,l = exp
(
ζ˜t,T1,l + log(Pt−1,T2,l)
)
P˜t,T2,l = exp
(
ζ˜t,T2,l + log(Pt,T1,l)
)
(3.20)
where ζ˜t,T1,l and ζ˜t,T2,l are two sets of random variates generated from the steps (a) and (b)
described above. Expression log(Pt,T1,l) appears twice in (3.19) to ensure the planting and
harvest time prices are generated on the same random walk path.
The imputed optimal nitrogen level defined in equation (3.18), N∗ is applied to corn yield
regression model (3.15) to obtain the corresponding corn yield forecast at year t, yˆt,C . Similarly,
we get soybean yield forecast, yˆt,S , from regression equation (3.16). The generated random
variates ξ˜C and ξ˜S are transformed to yield variable as
y˜t,i = yˆt,i ∗ ε˜t,i = yˆt,i ∗
(
ξ˜i ∗ (ε˜i,max − ε˜i,min) + ε˜i,min
)
(3.21)
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We consider the cases when the prior year crop was corn. Given simulated input, output
prices, optimal nitrogen application level, and yield realizations, we get expected revenues
from corn and soybeans at planting time T1. The corn and soybean profits are then obtained
by subtracting expected crop production costs from simulated revenues. Iowa annual crop
production cost budget data (Duffy and Smith 1979-2008) are used for approximation of the
production costs excluding cash rent costs. Then Vˆ1(t) and Vˆ2(t) in (3.7) are calculated.
To quantify the value of the real option embedded in cash rent valuation, we define %̂Π1 =(
Vˆ2(t)
Vˆ1(t)
− 1
)
× 100% as the relative percentage of the planting option value in terms of Vˆ1(t),
where Vˆ1(t) is the amount of cash rent determined by the traditional NPV method. The
simulated cash rents evaluated by the NPV and real option methods and the relative real
option value from 1995 to 2008 are presented in table 3.3. In terms of the input intensity
option, the values of Vˆ3(t) and Vˆ4(t) are calculated as well as the relative percentage of the
option value in terms of Vˆ4(t), %̂Π2 =
(
Vˆ3(t)
Vˆ4(t)
− 1
)
× 100%.
From the simulation results, the average cash rent evaluated by the real option approach
is about 13.5% higher than that of the traditional NPV method, in which the input intensity
option is about 0.47%. As corn and soybean profits converge, i.e., corn is planted in about 50%
of all simulation draws, the option value increases with a maximum value of 22.14% in 2002.
When the profit of one crop dominates the other, the switching option is not as valuable. This
was the case in 2004 and 2006 where in each case the option premium was less than 5% for
our simulation context.
Furthermore, to value the embedded real option in cash rent for 2008, we fix the nitrogen
fertilizer price as of August 2007 at $0.31/lb, corn production costs at $175.15, and soybean
production costs at $124.16 from the 2007 Iowa crop production budget (Duffy and Smith
2007). The corn price is assumed to vary from $3 to $6 and the soybean price is assumed to
be in the range of $6 to $15. The simulation result is shown in figure 3.1, which is a three-
dimensional ridge diagram summarizing the variation of relative real option value with changes
in corn and soybean prices. The average relative real option value is 9.13%, with range from
0% to 26.30%. The typical pattern for the switching option value is that the option tends to
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become more valuable as it gets closer to the money, i.e., the corn and soybean profits are
similar to each other. These are the situations when there is significant uncertainty about
planting intentions.
The simulation results presented in figure 3.1 are for the crop sequence of 〈CS〉. That is
figure 3.1 represents the real option values when one year after soybeans and two years after
corn. The real option values after the 〈CC〉 sequence is superimposed in figure 3.2, upon
taking account for the estimated yield decline of 29.12 bu./ac. for corn after corn relative to
corn after soybeans. Figure 3.2 indicates that compared with corn after soybeans, the same
real option values are achieved at comparatively higher corn prices to offset the potential yield
losses suffered by continuous corn.
Fixing the corn price as of 2007 at $3.47/bu and soybeans price at $8.76/bu, we simulate
the effect of correlation changes on the real option value. The results are presented in table
3.4. In the base scenario, about 11% of the cash rent paid out by a tenant farmer is estimated
to be the embedded real option including 0.24% input intensity option. The results of other
cases indicate that the real option value decreases with an increase in the correlation between
corn and soybean prices (ρ8), as well as when the corn and nitrogen fertilizer correlation (ρ9)
increases, but increases with higher correlation between soybean and nitrogen fertilizer prices
(ρ10). The sensitivities are small and confirm our comparative statics results in the conceptual
model.
Conclusion
After entering into a rental agreement in the fall, a tenant farmer has the flexibility to switch
between corn and soybeans for the next crop year and to choose the input application level.
The planting flexibility including switching and input application level can be treated as real
option, which should be reflected in cash rent paid out to the landowner. Without taking into
account the real option component, conventional NPV methods underestimate what farmers
should pay for rental land. Applying contingent claims analysis, this study explicitly derives
the value function of the real option. Comparative statics with respect to the volatilities of
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underlying state variables and their correlations are derived and discussed.
After estimating and imposing the dependence structure between yields and input/output
prices via a multivariate Gaussian copula, we simulate the switching and input intensity option
value by Monte Carlo methods. The results show that, on average, cash rent valuation by
the real option approach is about 13.5% higher than that measured by the traditional NPV
method. The input intensity option is about 0.47%. The option value becomes higher as corn
and soybean profits converge toward each other. Planting flexibility is worth little if profit
from one crop looks as if it will dominate the others.
The approach we have taken may have other applications in land cash rent analysis. Recent
fall and winter period grain prices have varied markedly, so that cash renters are increasingly
concerned about experiencing high rents but low revenues. Some, such as Schnitkey and Lattz
(2008) suggest that renting parties enter a price later contract whereby the rent is set several
months after land control is agreed upon. This is an option. Implementing a price later rental
contract would require a schedule mapping commodity and input prices into rents. Care in
schedule-setting would include all the features brought out in our model.
Appendix
Real Option Valuation
This appendix considers the production decision of a tenant farmer facing input and output
price uncertainty. Applying contingent claims analysis, we derive a closed-form solution for
switching option valuation.
Production Decision
First, let’s consider the production decision of a tenant farmer. We make the standard assump-
tions that markets are competitive and frictionless. There are perfectly competitive markets
for corn, soybeans, and nitrogen fertilizer. Tenant farmers are price takers who can borrow
and lend at the constant riskless rate r. Capital markets are assumed to be open all the time
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so that a portfolio can be continuously rebalanced. Furthermore, we assume non-stochastic
outputs for corn and soybeans in this section.
At planting time T1, a tenant farmer is assumed to solve the following expected profit
maximization problem when making the production and input choice decision:
max
{
max
yC
[FT1,CyC −KC(yC ,W )] ,maxyS [FT1,SyS −KS(yS ,W )]
}
(A-1)
where yi, i ∈ {C, S} are the decision choice variables, denoting expected outputs of corn and
soybeans, respectively. The FT1,i’s are expected output prices at harvest time T2 as represented
by planting time T1 prices of futures contracts that mature at harvest time T2. To promote
concise notation, futures maturity date T2 has been suppressed. We also simplify by ignoring
futures basis in this section. The Ki’s are the corn and soybean production cost functions.
The input price vector is W .
For analytical convenience, we assume that the cost function for soybean production follows
the output homogeneous and input price separable form:
KS(yS ,W ) = y
φS
S kS(W ) (A-2)
where φS > 1 is the elasticity of scale parameter. The expected profit for soybean at planting
time takes the form
piS(FT1,S ,W ) = ϕSF
δS
T1,S
(A-3)
where ϕS = (1 − 1φS ) [φSkS(W )]
− 1
φS−1 and δS = φSφS−1 . By the property of profit function
convexity, δS > 1.5
For corn production, nitrogen fertilizer is the second most expensive input after farmland
rent. Natural gas is the primary raw material in producing ammonia for nitrogen fertilizer.
The volatile natural gas price largely affects nitrogen’s price. For simplicity, we assume an
actively traded futures or forward market for nitrogen fertilizer. We also assume that all
5Observe that inserting the time T0 futures price into piS , rather than the time T1 price, will generally lead
to an understatement of profit. This is due to an application of Jensen’s inequality since piS is convex in prices
and FT1,S is random from the viewpoint of T0. So the traditional approach is likely to undervalue Ricardian
rent for more than one reason.
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nitrogen fertilizer is applied at planting.6 A Cobb-Douglas cost function KC(yC ,W ) is also
assumed for corn production:
KC(yC ,W ) = y
φC
C F
λ
T1,NkC(W ) (A-4)
where φC > 1 is the elasticity of scale parameter, FT1,N is the planting time price of an assumed
nitrogen futures or forward contract that matures at planting time T1, and λ > 0 is the demand
elasticity of nitrogen fertilizer.7 The planting time expected profit function for corn is8
piC(FT1,C , FT1,N ,W ) = ϕCF
δC
T1,C
F δNT1,N (A-5)
where ϕC = (1 − 1φC ) [φCkC(W )]
− 1
φC−1 , δC = φCφC−1 , and δN = − λφC−1 . By the property of
profit function convexity, δC > 1.
These are the inputs that enter equations (3.1) and (3.2).
Valuation of the Crops
Given expected profit functions for crop production at planting time T1, the crop present values
at any time t before planting can be derived using the contingent claim analysis methods. Given
a dynamically complete market for a contingent claim on the profits from the crop and using
futures contract markets on the commodities, a tenant farmer may form a hedged portfolio to
eliminate systemic risk and earn the risk-free rate of return instantaneously.
In the case of soybean, Ft,S is considered to be the only stochastic state variable determining
the value of soybean profit, V St (Ft,S), at time t. By applying contingent claim analysis methods,
it is shown that the value function V St (·) is
V St (Ft,S) = ϕS(Ft,S)
δS exp
{[
1
2
σ2Ft,SδS(δS − 1)− r
]
(T1 − t)
}
(A-6)
Demonstration of Equation (A-6):
6Studies indicate that in Iowa, application of nitrogen in fall potentially increases nitrogen loss and has a neg-
ative impact on profit. See www.ipm.iastate.edu/ipm/icm/2000/8-7-2000/falln.html for more information
(last visited 10/13/2008).
7While corn requires nitrogen for adequate growth and grain production, soybean generally receives little or
no nitrogen.
8Bear in mind that FT1,C and FT1,S are planting time T1 prices of harvest time T2 maturity contracts. The
nitrogen contract used has planting maturity, and not harvest maturity, as planting maturity is what is needed
for hedging.
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By Itoˆ’s lemma, the value function V St (·) follows the following stochastic process:
dV St =
(
∂V St
∂Ft,S
µFt,SFt,S +
∂V St
∂t
+
1
2
∂2V St
∂F 2t,S
σ2Ft,SF
2
t,S
)
dt+
∂V St
∂Ft,S
σFt,SFt,SdzS
It satisfies the Black differential equation (Hull 2002, p. 298):
∂V St
∂t
+
1
2
∂2V St
∂F 2t,S
σ2Ft,SF
2
t,S = rV
S
t
with the only non-trivial boundary condition as V ST1(FT1,S) = ϕSF
δS
T1,S
. The unique value
function V St (·) satisfying the above partial differential equation and the boundary condition is
given as equation (A-6). In addition, the value of soybeans profit follows an Itoˆ process as
dV St
V St
= αSdt+ σVSdzVS
where αS = δSµFt,S + r and σVSdzVS = δSσFt,SdzS . 
The expected corn and nitrogen fertilizer prices, Ft,C and Ft,N , are considered to be the
stochastic state variables driving the changes of corn value. Following Marcus and Modest
(1984), it is shown that the value function V Ct (·) is:
V Ct (Ft,C , Ft,N ) = ϕCF
δC
t,CF
δN
t,N exp
{[
1
2
δC(δC − 1)σ2Ft,C
+
1
2
δN (δN − 1)σ2Ft,N + δCδNσFt,CσFt,NρCN − r
]
(T1 − t)
}
(A-7)
Demonstration of Equation (A-7):
Applying Itoˆ’s lemma to the two state variables, Ft,C and Ft,N , we get the dynamics of the
corn value as:
dV Ct =
∂V Ct
∂Ft,C
dFt,C +
∂V Ct
∂Ft,N
dFt,N +
∂V Ct
∂t
dt+
1
2
∂2V Ct
∂F 2t,C
(dFt,C)2 +
1
2
∂2V Ct
∂F 2t,N
(dFt,N )2
+
∂2V Ct
∂Ft,C∂Ft,N
dFt,CdFt,N
=
(
∂V Ct
∂Ft,C
µFt,CFt,C +
∂V Ct
∂Ft,N
µFt,NFt,N +
∂V Ct
∂t
+
1
2
∂2V Ct
∂F 2t,C
σ2Ft,CF
2
t,C +
1
2
∂2V Ct
∂F 2t,N
σ2Ft,NF
2
t,N +
∂2V Ct
∂Ft,C∂Ft,N
Ft,CFt,NσFt,CσFt,NρCN
)
dt+
∂V Ct
∂Ft,C
Ft,CσFt,CdzC +
∂V Ct
∂Ft,N
Ft,NσFt,NdzN
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Following Marcus and Modest (1984), the hedging portfolio includes (1) the claim to the
farmer’s corn profit, (2) ∂V
C
t
∂Ft,C
short positions in the corn futures contracts, (3) ∂V
C
t
∂Ft,N
short
positions in the assumed nitrogen fertilizer futures contracts, and (4) borrowing the amount of
V Ct at the risk free rate r. By design, the return on this portfolio is instantaneously riskless,
which implies that the valuation function V Ct (·) satisfies the partial differential equation
∂V Ct
∂t
+
1
2
∂2V Ct
∂F 2t,C
σ2Ft,CF
2
t,C +
1
2
∂2V Ct
∂F 2t,N
σ2Ft,NF
2
t,N +
∂2V Ct
∂Ft,C∂Ft,N
Ft,CFt,NσFt,CσFt,NρCN − rV Ct = 0
with the boundary condition V CT1 (FT1,C , FT1,N ) = ϕCF
δC
T1,C
F δNT1,N . The value function satisfying
the above partial differential equation and the boundary condition is as equation (A-7).
The value of corn profit follows a geometric Brownian motion as
dV Ct
V Ct
= αCdt+ σVCdzVC
where αC = δCµFt,C + δNµFt,N + r, σVCdzVC = δCσFt,CdzC + δNσFt,NdzN . 
Notice that
(a) the time t present value of crop V it , i ∈ {C, S} increases with higher expected output prices
Ft,i since
∂V it
∂Ft,i
= δiV
i
t
Ft,i
> 0;
(b) the time t present value of corn V Ct decreases with nitrogen fertilizer futures price Ft,N for
δN < 0 since
∂V Ct
∂Ft,N
= δNV
C
t
Ft,N
< 0;
(c) the time t value of the soybean crop goes up with an increase in the volatility of soybean’s
futures price σ2Ft,S , as implied by
∂V St
∂σ2Ft,S
= 12δS(δS − 1)V St (·)(T1 − t) > 0;
(d) higher correlation between corn and nitrogen fertilizer prices ρCN reduces the value of corn
for δCδN < 0 as
∂V Ct
∂ρCN
= δCδNσFt,CσFt,NV
C
t (·)(T1 − t) < 0.
Value of the Switching Option
Demonstration of Equation (3.5):
We assume that the option value function Π(·) is linear homogeneous in V Ct and V St . Now
let V St be the nume´raire with price of unity and define the price of V
C
t as Vt = V
C
t /V
S
t . Given
(A-6) and (A-7), the relative value also follows geometric Brownian motion. Applying Itoˆ’s
64
lemma, the dynamics of Vt are given by
dVt
Vt
= µV dt+ σV dzV
where µV = αC − αS + δ2Sσ2Ft,S − δCδSσFt,CσFt,SρCS − δSδNσFt,SσFt,NρSN , and σV dzV =
δCσFt,CdzC + δNσFt,NdzN − δSσFt,SdzS .
Now, the option to switch between corn and soybeans is a call option on the value of corn,
with exercise price equal to unity and interest rate equal to zero. Applying the Black-Scholes
formula on this special case, the value of the switching option is given as equation (3.5). 
Comparative Statics of the Switching Option
The option Vegas can be derived as follows
i. effect of a change in σFt,C :
∂Π
∂σFt,C
= V Ct Φ(d1)
A︷ ︸︸ ︷[
δC(δC − 1)σFt,C + δCδNσFt,NρCN
]
(T1 − t)
+V Ct φ(d1)
(
δ2CσFt,C + δCδNσFt,NρCN − δCδSσFt,SρCS
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
√
T1 − t
σV
(A-8)
where φ(·) is the pdf of standard normal distribution. Note that if δC ≈ 1 and ρCN ≈ 0, then
term A in (A-8) is approximately 0. But term B could be negative if δCσFt,C < δSσFt,SρCS , so
that the whole expression can have negative value.
Demonstration of Equation (A-8):
∂Π
∂σFt,C
=
∂V Ct
∂σFt,C
Φ(d1) + V Ct
∂Φ(d1)
∂d1
∂d1
∂σFt,C
− ∂V
S
t
∂σFt,C
Φ(d2)− V St
∂Φ(d2)
∂d2
∂d2
∂σFt,C
=
∂V Ct
∂σFt,C
Φ(d1) + V Ct φ(d1)
∂d1
∂σFt,C
− ∂V
S
t
∂σFt,C
Φ(d2)− V St φ(d2)
(
∂d1
∂σFt,C
− ∂σV
∂σFt,C
√
T1 − t
)
=
∂V Ct
∂σFt,C
Φ(d1) + V St φ(d2)
∂σV
∂σFt,C
√
T1 − t
Equation (A-8) follows. The third equality holds because we have (a) V Ct φ(d1) = V
S
t φ(d2);
(b) ∂V
S
t
∂σFt,C
= 0. 
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ii. effect of a change in σFt,S :
∂Π
∂σFt,S
= V St Φ(d2)
A′︷ ︸︸ ︷[
δS(δS − 1)σFt,S
]
(T1 − t)
+V St φ(d2)
(
δ2SσFt,S − δSδNσFt,NρSN − δSδCσFt,SρCS
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B′
√
T1 − t
σV
A sufficient condition for a positive overall effect is δSσFt,S > δNσFt,NρSN + δCσFt,SρCS given
that δS > 1. If δS ≈ 1, then A′ ≈ 0, but B′ could be negative. So a negative overall effect
cannot be precluded.
iii. effect of a change in σFt,N :
∂Π
∂σFt,N
= V Ct Φ(d1)
A′′︷ ︸︸ ︷[
δN (δN − 1)σFt,N + δCδNσFt,CρCN
]
(T1 − t)
+V Ct φ(d1)
(
δ2NσFt,N − δCδNσFt,CρCN − δSδNσFt,SρSN
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B′′
√
T1 − t
σV
Also note that if δN ≈ 1 and ρCN ≈ 0, then A′′ ≈ 0, but B′′ could be negative if σFt,N <
σFt,SρSN .
In addition, the partial derivative of the switching option with respect to correlation be-
tween underlying price variables can be derived as:
iv. effect of a change in ρCS :
∂Π
∂ρCS
= −V Ct φ(d1)δCδSσFt,CσFt,S
√
T1 − t
σV
< 0 (A-9)
Demonstration of Equation (A-9):
∂Π
∂ρCS
=
∂V Ct
∂ρCS
Φ(d1) + V Ct φ(d1)
∂d1
∂ρCS
− ∂V
S
t
∂ρCS
Φ(d2)− V St φ(d2)
∂d2
∂ρCS
= −V Ct φ(d1)
∂σV
∂ρCS
√
T1 − t
Equation (A-9) follows. The second equality holds because we have (a) V Ct φ(d1) = V
S
t φ(d2);
(b) ∂V
C
t
∂ρCS
= ∂V
S
t
∂ρCS
= 0. 
v. effect of a change in ρCN :
∂Π
∂ρCN
= V Ct δCδNσFt,CσFt,N
[
Φ(d1)(T1 − t) + φ(d1)
√
T1 − t/σV
]
< 0 as δC > 0 > δN .
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vi. effect of a change in ρSN :
∂Π
∂ρSN
= −V Ct φ(d1)δSδNσFt,SσFt,N
√
T1 − t/σV > 0 as δS > 0 > δN .
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Table 3.1 OLS Regression Results for Corn and Soybean Yields
Estimates Std. Error t Value P (> |t|)
Corn Yield
Year 0.27 0.089 3.02 0.0026
Nitrogen 0.68 0.025 27.26 < 0.001
(Nitrogen)2 -0.00163 0.000099 -16.37 < 0.001
Dummy for CC -29.12 1.29 -22.65 < 0.001
Intercept 87.69 1.843 47.59 < 0.001
R2 0.5371
Soybean Yield
Year 0.79 0.092 8.67 < 0.001
Dummy for CCS 4.67 1.40 3.33 0.001
Intercept 34.27 1.65 20.74 < 0.001
R2 0.2797
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Table 3.2 Estimates of Marginal Distributions and the Gaussian Copula
Marginal Distributions Parameter 1 Parameter 2
Corn yield Beta 7.04 2.81
Soybean yield Beta 6.02 2.55
Corn price Normal 0.0011 0.11
Soybean price Normal 0.0018 0.096
Nitrogen price Normal 0.012 0.063
Dependent parameter Estimate z-value p> |z|
Corn yield
∼ soybean yield (ρ1) 0.6689 7.29 < 0.001
∼ corn price (ρ2) -0.4252 -2.84 0.0045
∼ soybean price (ρ3) -0.2352 -1.34 0.18
∼ nitrogen price (ρ4) -0.2111 -1.14 0.25
Soybean yield
∼ corn price (ρ5) -0.3589 -2.25 0.024
∼ soybean price (ρ6) -0.1446 -0.79 0.43
∼ nitrogen price (ρ7) -0.2683 -1.49 0.13
Corn price
∼ soybean price (ρ8) 0.7645 11.64 < 0.001
∼ nitrogen price (ρ9) 0.1693 0.89 0.37
Soybean price
∼ nitrogen price (ρ10) 0.0496 0.25 0.80
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Figure 3.1 Simulated Real Option Value under Corn-Soybean Rotation,
2007
Figure 3.2 Real Option Value under Corn-Corn and Corn-Soybean Rota-
tions, 2007
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4. THE IMPACT OF ETHANOL PRODUCTION ON U.S. AND
REGIONAL GASOLINE PRICES AND ON WELFARE
Abstract
We quantify the impact of ethanol production on wholesale gasoline price employing pooled
regional time-series data from January 1995 to March 2008. This analysis suggests that the
growth in ethanol production has caused wholesale gasoline prices to be 14¢/gallon lower
than would otherwise have been the case. Furthermore, the negative impact of ethanol on
retail gasoline price is found to vary considerably across regions. The Midwest region has
the biggest impact at 34¢/gallon, while the Rocky Mountain region had the smallest impact,
7¢/gallon. The results indicate that the reduction in gasoline price comes at the expense of
refiners’ profits and structure changes in the refining industry significantly impact gasoline
prices. This study estimates the welfare changes for consumers and producers resulting from
ethanol production and related support polices in 2007. The welfare estimates are based
on a transparent analytical model of multiple markets including corn, ethanol, gasoline, and
transportation fuel. The results suggest a net welfare loss of $0.28 billion from the support
policies. We validate the model’s underlying assumption and test for the results’ sensitivity to
assumed parameters.
Key words: consumer surplus, crack ratio, crack spread, deadweight loss, subsidy, substitution.
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Introduction
World oil consumption is projected to grow by 1 million barrels per day in 2008 (Energy
Information Administration, EIA hereafter, 2008). Rising consumption comes mainly from
continued economic growth in developing countries especially China and India. Declining
production in countries outside of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), together with weak OPEC supply, is in part responsible for the recent reduction in
global oil supplies. Biofuels are becoming a major source of incremental fuel supply and make
up a significant portion of the growth in fuel production (Blanch et al. 2008). The non-OPEC
supply growth forecast for 2008 by the International Energy Agency (IEA) is 455,000 barrel
per day, of which 72% will be in the form of biofuels.
The U.S. consumed approximately 146 billion gallons of petroleum in 2007. Responding to
increased mandates and oil prices, fuel ethanol production in the United States increased from
1.63 billion gallons in 2000 to 6.5 billion gallons in 2007 (RFA 2008), which is approximately
81.8 million barrels of oil equivalent (BP 2008). In July 2008, production had reached 9.3
billion gallons on an annualized basis, and ethanol plants with an additional 4.3 billion gallons
of capacity were under construction.
Ethanol is blended with gasoline to improve octane and performance in about 50% of the
nation’s gasoline supply. Typically, a gallon of ethanol blend will have 10% ethanol and 90%
gasoline. This gallon of ethanol blend will contain approximately 96.81% of the energy of a
gallon of gasoline (Tokgoz et al. 2007) and will use approximately one-tenth as much fuel
energy to produce as it contains (Wang et al. 2007). Therefore, ethanol has essentially added
to U.S. gasoline supplies by utilizing solar energy to grow the crop, coupled with energy from
natural gas and coal to manufacture the farm equipment and fertilizer used in crop production.
According to estimates by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Department of En-
ergy (DOE), ethanol production in 2008 will have reduced gasoline demand by approximately
5%, or 7.2 billion gallons (USDA/DOE 2008).
One purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of the increase in ethanol supply on
the U.S. gasoline market. For this purpose, we need to separate the impact of ethanol from
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the other forces driving gasoline prices. We examine the crack ratio, the price of gasoline
relative to the price of crude oil, and the crack spread, an accepted proxy for the profitability
of the refining industry and we control for other factors that might influence these ratios. The
estimates of the impact on gasoline prices are calculated for the U.S. as a whole and for each
of five regions within the U.S. The motivation for conducting the regional analysis is that if
ethanol is affecting gasoline prices, then we hypothesize that this impact will be largest in the
Midwest where regional ethanol production and utilization is at its maximum.
The ethanol industry in the U.S. receives support on several different fronts. There are
three major categories: (1) Budgetary support measures, including a 51¢-per-gallon tax credit
to refiners blending ethanol with gasoline. This is scheduled to fall to 45¢ in January 2009.
(2) A renewable fuel standard (RFS) that requires U.S. fuel producers to blend into gasoline
at least certain amount of renewable fuel, ranging from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion
gallons by 2022. (3) Trade restrictions, including a 2.5% ad valorem tariff and a per unit tariff
of 54¢ per gallon. The benefits and pitfalls of this level of government support have been at
the center of recent debate.
In this study, based on the estimated substitution effect of ethanol on gasoline, we inves-
tigate the distribution of welfare gains and losses from the ethanol blenders tax credit among
producers and consumers in the corn, ethanol, gasoline and fuel markets and estimate the
overall welfare impact of the U.S. ethanol subsidy. To the best of our knowledge, our study
is the first to include the impact of ethanol on the gasoline market, and to acknowledge in
a multi-market framework that prior to the existence of a large ethanol industry, commodity
markets were already in a second best situation.
Our contribution is three-fold. First, estimation results show that over the sample period,
ethanol production had a significant negative effect of 14¢ per gallon on wholesale gasoline
prices. Results for individual regions indicate that the largest impact of ethanol on gasoline
is found in the Midwest region where regular retail gasoline prices were reduced by 34¢ per
gallon. The West Coast and East Coast are found to have experienced 25¢ and 23¢ reduction
in the retail gasoline price, while for the Gulf Coast region the average price drop is about
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20¢. The smallest impact is found in the Rocky Mountain region, at 7¢ per gallon, possibly
because of its comparatively low ethanol consumption. We also quantify the impact of ethanol
production on refinery profitability represented by 3-2-1 crack spread. The results suggest that
the reduction in gasoline prices came at the expense of refiners’ profits, which is about $1.33
per barrel.
Our second contribution is to examine the effects of important structure changes in the
petroleum refining industry: (1) changes in refinery ownership related to mergers and acquisi-
tions, and (2) increasing refinery complexity and downstream processing capacity. The results
indicate that refinery market concentration and refinery complexity lead to higher gasoline
prices and refinery profits. Our third contribution is that we develop an analytical model ex-
plicit in its accounting of ethanol, gasoline, and fuel markets. We estimate the welfare impacts
on agricultural and energy markets, and on overall welfare change after accounting for re-
duced loan deficiency payments. The welfare estimates are done by both traditional consumer
(producer) surplus formulas and the compensating variation measure.
The paper proceeds by providing a review of previous work regarding the determining
factors of gasoline price and the welfare analysis of ethanol supporting policies. The following
section presents an empirical analysis of the impact of ethanol production on gasoline price. It
starts with a brief introduction of the petroleum refining process and the U.S. regional refinery
markets. A detailed description of, and motivation for, each of the explanatory variables
used in the analysis follows. The estimation method and results for a fixed effects model
are presented. In the welfare analysis section, we discuss an analytical model and empirical
estimates of welfare changes. We validate the model’s underlying assumption and test for the
results’ sensitivity to assumed parameters. The paper concludes with a summary of the major
findings and provides suggestions for future research.
Previous Work
Analysis of the effect of ethanol on gasoline prices and on refinery profitability has been largely
neglected in the literature. Eidman (2005) points out that ethanol has a strong positive cor-
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relation with gasoline prices. Employing an international ethanol model, Tokgoz and Elobeid
(2007) analyze the price linkage between ethanol and gasoline markets. Vedenov et al. (2006)
suggests that blending ethanol into gasoline would generate lower gasoline price volatility and
that switching from conventional gasoline to an ethanol blend is an economically sound de-
cision. There are a considerable number of government and academic studies that seek to
explain gasoline price changes and adjustments in the wholesale market and to identify factors
that contribute to gasoline price spikes.1
A recurring theme in the literature is the contribution of market concentration on the price
of gasoline. Oladunjoye (2008) finds that market concentration has a significant asymmetric
effect on the response of gasoline prices to crude price shocks. The U.S. Government Ac-
counting Office (GAO 2004) concludes that increased market concentration generally led to
higher wholesale gasoline prices from the mid-1990s through 2000. Examining wholesale price
responses in 188 gasoline markets in the U.S., Borenstein and Shepard (2002) find that refin-
ery firms with market power generally adjust prices more slowly than do competitive firms.
Geweke (2003) provides a comprehensive survey on this subject.
A related line of research separates the effects of regional gasoline content regulations
on gasoline price spikes. Muehlegger (2006) estimates that price increases due to content
regulations through increased production costs and fuel incompatibility are 9.3¢, 9.6¢, and
10.0¢ per gallon in California, Illinois, and Wisconsin, respectively. Brown et al. (2008) find
that content regulations are associated with an increase in wholesale and retail gasoline prices
of 3¢6¢ per gallon. Various studies support asymmetric price adjustments on the U.S. wholesale
gasoline market (e.g., Radchenko 2005a,b; Kaufmann and Laskowshi 2005; Borenstein et al.
1997), while Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) find no evidence of asymmetry in wholesale gasoline
prices.
Another strand of literature investigates various issues related to the petroleum refining
industry. The important examples include the following studies. Griffin (1972) and Adams
1A number of government studies qualitatively analyze gasoline price spikes and the effect of market concen-
tration on gasoline prices, including, for example, Pirog (2005) and EIA (1996). We don’t include these studies
in this review.
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and Griffin (1972) provide a linear programming application of process analysis to petroleum
refining. Using a multiproduct restricted cost function with adjustment costs, Considine (1992)
analyzes the short-run petroleum product supply in the U.S. Considine (1997) analyzes the de-
terminants of inventory investment under joint production for the petroleum refining industry.
Asano (2002) employs five econometric models to examine lumpy investment and investigate
the investment behavior of the U.S. petroleum refining industry. Chen (2002) investigates the
survival of U.S. petroleum refining plants for the period 1981-86 and examines the duration
dependence and determinants of a plant’s lifetime.
There are an increasing number of studies on the welfare analysis of ethanol subsidies. Bab-
cock (2008) simulates the welfare impacts of various government ethanol policies in a model
of multiple integrated markets. He finds that U.S. ethanol policy induces large welfare trans-
fer from taxpayers and non-ethanol corn users to corn producers, fuel blenders, and ethanol
producers, as well as large associated net welfare loss. Gardner (2007) used a vertical market
model of corn, ethanol, and byproducts and compares welfare effects of the government’s sub-
sidy on corn through deficiency payments and the government subsidy on ethanol produced
from corn. He finds that the net deadweight loss of the corn and ethanol subsidies is likely to
be in the billions of dollars annually. The deadweight loss of ethanol subsidy is much higher
than that of deficiency payment. This conclusion is based on the assumption that corn price
increases by only 4¢ resulting from the ethanol subsidy, which is much smaller than what hap-
pened in the recent corn market. Schmitz, Moss, and Schmitz (2007) calculate the impact of
ethanol subsidies on corn used for ethanol and indicate that treasury cost of the ethanol tax
credit is about $1.0 billion lower than direct payment to corn farmers.
Martinez-Gonzalez, Sheldon, and Thompson (2007) use a partial equilibrium trade model
and back-of the envelope formula to calculate welfare effects of distortions in the ethanol
market. Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008) analyze the impact of trade liberalization and removal
of the federal tax credit in U.S. on ethanol markets but excluding energy markets in a multi-
market international ethanol framework. They find that trade liberalization induces welfare
loss of ethanol and corn producers and a gain in consumer surplus of ethanol through lower
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ethanol and corn prices. Also, the removal of the tariff and tax credit result in declines in
corn farmers, ethanol producers, and ethanol consumer surpluses. de Gorter and Just (2007)
analyze the efficiency and income distribution effects of the ethanol tax credit and illustrate
the potential welfare effects empirically, they find a net deadweight loss is $1.07 billion per
year. Taheripour and Tyner (2007) find that the share of ethanol subsidy received by ethanol
producers (1) increases with the elasticity of substitution between ethanol and gasoline and
also the proportion of ethanol blended in fuel; (2) decreases with the price elasticity of ethanol.
They concluded that ethanol industry is, and will continue to be in a good position to capture
the ethanol tax credit regardless of its current share.
Empirical Analysis
This section starts with a brief introduction of petroleum refining process and regional refinery
markets. Employing a fixed effects panel data model that takes serial autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity into account, we empirically estimation the impact of ethanol production
on gasoline price after controlling other determining factors.
Background
A typical petroleum refinery is a complex chemical processing and manufacturing plant, with
crude oil feedstocks going in, and refined products coming out. In the first phase of petroleum
processing, refineries heat and separate crude oil into certain intermediate products using
an atmospheric distillation unit. “Downstream” from this initial refinery process are more
complex processing units that are used to increase a refinery’s flexibility to process a wide
range of crude oils and increase the yield of lighter petroleum products such as gasoline.
Separation products from the distillation unit are upgraded by changing their chemical
structure through processes such as coking, hydrocracking, and fluid catalytic cracking. After
removing impurities, the refiner blends various products into end products. End products are
classified into light products, including gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene and diesel fuel, and heavier
products such as fuel oil and coke. The mix of refined products can be adjusted to a limited
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extent in response to relative prices of the final products under the constraints of production
capacity, availability of crude oil, and adjustment costs.
Crude oil is a heterogeneous good whose density is commonly measured by API (American
Petroleum Institute) gravity. The higher the API number, the lighter the crude. West Texas
Intermediate (WTI) crude oil is classified as a light sour crude oil, having a typical API gravity
of about 33 degrees and a sulfur content of about 1.6%. The price difference between light and
heavy crude oils and light and heavy refinery products provides a strong incentive for installing
downstream processing facilities in a refinery. Over the past 20 years, the refining industry
shifted investment from crude oil distillation capacity to downstream processing capacity (EIA
2007).
There are three main octane-level-based grades of finished gasoline: regular, mid-grade,
and premium. Finished gasoline is delivered from oil refineries by barge or pipeline to regional
wholesale terminals. Then, gasoline is sold to retail stations either at a bulk price, a rack price,
or the Dealer Tank Wagon (DTW) price.
We use the PADDs to define refinery product markets, and use these PADD districts
interchangeably with more intuitive regional names. The five regions are the East Coast
(PADD I), the Midwest (PADD II), the Gulf Coast (PADD III), the Rocky Mountains (PADD
IV), and the West Coast (PADD V). These five geographically distinct regions are also very
different in terms of their economic conditions, oil and petroleum characteristics, oil-related
pipeline infrastructure, and local product supply and demand conditions.
The East Coast region (PADD I) has the highest demand for refined products but has a
very limited refinery capacity. Its regional demand is largely satisfied by the Gulf Coast and
by foreign imports. The Midwest region (PADD II) leads the nation in ethanol production,
mainly because of its leading role in production of corn, which is the primary feedstock for
ethanol production. Much of the crude oil used in the Midwest is piped in from the Gulf Coast
and Canada.
The Gulf Coast region (PADD III) produces over 50% of the nation’s crude oil and 47% of
its final refined products. This region also serves as a national hub for crude oil and is the center
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of the pipeline system. The Rocky Mountain region, PADD IV, has the smallest and fastest-
growing oil market in the U.S., with only 3% of national petroleum product consumption. The
West Coast region (PADD V) is geographically separated from the rest of the country by the
Rocky Mountains, which makes its oil supply logistics independent of other regions.
Data
This study focuses on oil refiners’ production decisions. We assume that for a given ownership
structure, net gasoline import, and crude oil price, refiners make production decisions prior
to production runs so as to maximize expected profits contingent upon the short-run capacity
limitation, inventory levels, and unrealized supply disruption. The short-run distillation capac-
ity and inventory levels are costly to adjust. To examine the impacts of ethanol production on
gasoline prices and refinery profits, we employ the crack ratio and crack spread as dependent
variables in this study.
The crack ratio (piCR), which is defined as the gasoline price relative to that of crude oil,
is calculated as
piCR = PG ∗ 42/PO (4.1)
where PG is the average wholesale gasoline price (dollars per gallon) for all grades,2 and PO is
the U.S. crude oil composite acquisition cost by refiners (dollars per barrel).
The 3-2-1 crack spread (piCS) is defined as
piCS =
2
3
PG ∗ 42 + 13PH ∗ 42− PO (4.2)
where PH is the wholesale price of No. 2 distillate fuel (dollars per gallon). All prices are
from monthly data obtained from the EIA website. The crack spread, piCS , is deflated by the
Producer Price Index (PPI) for crude energy material. The PPI data are obtained from the
website of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2Using regional spot prices of Reformulated Gasoline Blendstock for Oxygen Blending (RBOB), which is
a motor gasoline blending component that has no oxygenates blended including fuel ethanol, we get similar
estimation results. See the Appendix A.1.
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Crude oil and gasoline prices are closely related, as they are the raw material and the final
product of the refining process. EIA refinery yield data shows that crude oil is the dominant
input into the refinery, and that gasoline accounts for on average 47% of U.S. refinery output.
The crack ratio is found to be empirically consistent and well suited to econometric analysis
as a measure of refinery margins (Brown and Virmani 2007). The 3-2-1 crack spread has been
institutionalized over the years as an alternative indicator of the refinery margins. Gasoline
and distillate fuel oil are the two primary products of the refining industry, together comprising
about 80% of refinery yield. The relative proportion of these two products is approximately
two barrels of gasoline to one barrel of distillate fuel from three barrels of crude oil. Figures 4.1
and 4.2 present the monthly crack ratio and deflated 3-2-1 crack spread for five PADD regions
over the period of 1995-2008. The graphs present similar seasonal and non-seasonal patterns
for the crack ratio and the 3-2-1 crack spread.
Monthly dummy variables are incorporated to control for seasonal patterns. The non-
seasonal patterns of the indices are controlled for by demand and supply conditions, the com-
plexity adjusted distillation capacity, market concentration, unexpected supply disruptions,
gasoline imports, and ethanol production. Summary statistics for these variables can be found
in table 4.1. Each of these chosen variables and its relationship with refinery profitability are
discussed next.
Seasonality
Heavily influenced by gasoline markets, U.S. refining profit margins are highest in the spring
and summer (EIA 1996), because of strong demand induced by seasonal driving patterns.
Demand for distillate fuel, including heating oil and diesel fuel, typically peaks in winter and
thus exhibits a counter-cyclical price pattern with gasoline. Distillates have a smaller volume
and hence a smaller influence on refining profit. Therefore, the crack ratio and the crack
spread show seasonal swings corresponding to price variation in the gasoline market. The
refining margin is typically lowest during the winter months when gasoline demand and prices
fall and inventories are building, and is highest in summer months.
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Crude and Product Market Conditions
We hypothesize that gasoline prices and refinery profits are impacted by supply and demand
balances in crude oil and refinery product markets. When stocks in the crude oil market are
high, refinery profits should increase because of lower input costs. Alternatively, when there
are large stocks of gasoline and other refinery products, refinery profits should fall. A tight
product market will generate upward pressure on product prices even when there is an ample
supply of crude oil. Product prices will be bid up by more than any underlying crude price
increase. This upward movement relative to crude oil prices will show up as an increase in the
corresponding crack ratio and crack spread. Crude oil and gasoline stocks not only provide
a cushion between major short-term supply and demand imbalances but also indicate price
pressures. Monthly crude oil ending stocks excluding the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)
and total motor gasoline ending stock data were downloaded from the EIA website.
Complexity Adjusted Refinery Capacity
Refinery capacity is an indicator of the refining industry’s ability to satisfy demand. Down-
stream processing facilities extend a refiner’s flexibility to adjust its product slate in order
to meet market demand for high-quality refinery products and changing environmental reg-
ulations. The production flexibility in turn improves the refinery’s efficiency and results in
a reduction in variable costs and an increase in refinery margin. The downstream facilities
include fluid catalytic cracking (FCC), hydrocracking, coking, and other residual conversion
facilities that convert the heavy material in crude oil to lighter, higher-valued products such
as gasoline and diesel.
We employ regional equivalent distillation capacity (EDC), which is a complexity-adjusted
measurement of a refiner’s total production capacity and is used commonly in the refining
industry as a normalized measure of production. Annual EDC for region i is calculated as
EDCi =
n∑
j=1
cj ·Mij i = 1, ..., 5, j = 1, ..., n. (4.3)
where cj , j = 1, ..., n is the Nelson’s complexity index (Nelson 1976,1978) for downstream
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processing unit j. Mij , i = 1, ...5 are production capacities of the corresponding processing
units in region i.
The Nelson complexity index is a measure of secondary conversion capacity in comparison
to the primary distillation capacity. It is an indicator of the value addition potential of a
refinery, in which a factor 1 is assigned to the atmospheric distillation unit. We consider six
(n = 6) downstream processing units: vacuum distillation, thermal cracking, fluid & delayed
coking, catalytic cracking, catalytic reforming, and catalytic hydrotreating units. Complexity
indices of these downstream units are shown in table 4.2. Regional level capacity data are
collected from the EIA website whereby capacity of each process is measured by barrels per
steam day, which is the volume of inputs that can be processed when running at full capacity
under optimal conditions. Figure 4.3 presents annual EDC for five PADD regions for 1995-
2007. Total EDC in the U.S. increased by 22% over the past twelve years, with PADD III, the
Gulf Coast, having the highest growth of 30%. The lowest increase in EDC occurred in the
West Coast, with a 10% growth over the same period.
Refinery Market Concentration
Mergers and acquisitions among refinery firms may potentially reduce competition in the refin-
ery market leading to higher refinery margins. To measure the level of market concentration,
the common Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is applied in the study. The annual HHI of a
specific refinery market is calculated as
HHIt =
Nt∑
i=1
S2it (4.4)
where Sit is the market share of a specific refiner in the corresponding market with total
refinery firms of Nt at year t. A market with an HHI less than 1,000 is considered to be a
competitive market; 1,000-1,800, a moderately concentrated market, and greater than 1,800,
a highly concentrated market (GAO 2004).
We constructed HHIs for the individual PADD regions over the period of 1995-2007, which
are presented in figure 4.4. The HHI for the refinery market in PADD I increased from 1,558 to
2,335 from 1995 to 2007 and changed from a moderately concentrated to a highly concentrated
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market. Since much of this region’s refinery product supply is from other regions, the impact
of this increased concentration may be small. The refinery market in PADD II, the Midwest,
suggests that this is a competitive market, although its HHI increased to 960 in 2007. Similarly,
PADD III, the Gulf Coast, also has a competitive refinery market as of the end of 2007. The
HHI for PADD IV, the Rocky Mountains, decreased from 1,025 to 930, which suggests that its
refinery market became less concentrated than before. The HHI for PADD V, the West Coast,
increased from 914 to 1,155, and this refinery market changed to a moderately concentrated
market by 2007.
Unexpected Supply Disruptions
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit the U.S. Gulf Coast at New Orleans. On September
24, 2005, Hurricane Rita hit at the border between Texas and Louisiana. Both were category
four storms when they did significant damage to the refineries’ facilities and pipeline in the
Gulf Coast region. Refinery operations were reduced by 1.8 million barrel per day in September
and October 2005. Retail gasoline prices were distinctly higher than before and jumped by
$0.50 to over $3.00 per gallon on a national average basis after Hurricane Rita. In order to
control for the effect of this event on the gasoline price and refinery margin, we include dummy
variables for September and October of 2005, when the disruptions were most severe.
Gasoline Imports
A significant share of total gasoline demand in the U.S. is met by imports. The net import
share of total gasoline consumption in 2007 is 14%. Major sources of gasoline imports in-
clude Canada, Europe, and the Virgin Islands. A structural surplus in gasoline production
in Europe means that gasoline production costs are lower when derived from foreign sources
than they would be if the U.S. built and operated additional refinery capacity domestically.
Growth in imports is expected to be tempered because of the increased use of domestically
produced ethanol. Also, refinery profitability is expected to be negatively affected by increases
in imported gasoline. Monthly finished motor gasoline imports from all countries of individual
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regions are included in this study. The data were downloaded from the EIA website.
Gasoline imports is likely to be endogenous as included and may possibly lead to inconsis-
tent estimates. One solution is to find legitimate instruments, which need to be uncorrelated
with the current error term and correlated with the dependent variables. Two sets of instru-
mental variables are chosen to deal with the possible endogeneity problem: (1) the one-month
lagged individual region imports, and (2) one- and two-month lagged price difference between
the U.S. refinery region and the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) refining hub. The
latter is more reflective of the prices in inland European market. We hypothesize that the
monthly regional gasoline imports are considered to be dynamically adjusted according to the
gasoline price difference between local and international markets.
In the first stage of IV estimation, fitted regional gasoline imports are obtained from the
following regression and used as the exogenous variable in the final regression.
Importi,t = α+ β Importi,t−1 + δ1 dPi,t−1 + δ2 dPi,t−2 (4.5)
where Importi,t represent imports of gasoline to the U.S. regional refinery market, PADD
i, at month t, dPi,t−1 and dPi,t−2 are the one- and two-month lagged price differential of
the conventional regular gasoline between region i and ARA. Given the instrument’s validity,
the Davidson-MacKinnon’s exogeneity test (F test) statistic (Davidson and Mackinnon 1993,
p. 237) is 4.22 (7.33) for the crack ratio (crack spread) and the null hypothesis of exogeneity
is rejected at 5% (1%) significance level.
Ethanol Production
There are approximately 161 ethanol plants in service in 2008 compared to 68 plants in 2003,
with a production capacity of 9.357 million gallons per year (mgy) (RFA 2008). An additional
49 plants are under construction or expanding and these will bring the total up to 13.645 billion
gallons. Since most of the nation’s corn is produced in the Midwest, ethanol plants have been
concentrated within this region. Iowa produces about 30% of the nation’s ethanol and has
two to three times as much production capacity as neighboring states. Our hypothesis is that
this additional production has had a negative impact on gasoline prices and on the margins of
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crude oil refiners. Monthly U.S. fuel ethanol production data were downloaded from the EIA
website and employed in this study.
Estimation
In this section, we consider the estimation based on panel data of five PADD regions over the
period of January 1995 to March 2008. Various stationarity/unit root tests are applied on
data series of the crack ratio and crack spread to understand their time-series properties.
The Levin-Lin-Chu test (Levin, Lin, and Chu 2002), hereafter denoted by LLC, and the
Im-Pesaran-Shin test (Im, Pesaran, and Shin 2003), hereafter denoted by IPS, and the cross-
sectionally augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Pesaran 2007), hereafter denoted by CADF, are
applied on the panel data of the crack ratio and crack spread. Under the null hypothesis,
all three tests assume that all series in the panel are non-stationary processes against the
alternative that all series are stationary. The LLC test is applicable for homogeneous panels,
where the autoregressive coefficients for unit roots are assumed to be the same across sections.
The IPS test allows for heterogeneous panels. But both the LLC and IPS tests assume that
the individual processes are cross-sectionally independent. The CADF test can be applied
to heterogenous panels with cross-sectional dependence. Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte (2007)
point out that panel unit root tests like the CADF test, which explicitly allow for cross-sectional
dependence, have better performance than other classical panel unit root tests that assume
cross-sectional independence. The test results in table 4.3 show that the null hypotheses of
non-stationarity are rejected at the 1% significance level, which indicates that both the crack
ratio and 3-2-1 crack spread are level stationary.
In addition, refinery margin is liable to exhibit lagged behavior over time. It may be
reasonable to assume that observations on the same region in consecutive time periods are
correlated. Applying the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data for the crack ratio
(crack spread) (Wooldridge 2002, p. 282), we get F-test statistics of 237.11 (272.20), which are
highly significant, and the null hypotheses of no first-order autocorrelation are rejected.
Next, we account for heterogeneity across regions by using the fixed effects estimator. To
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justify the fixed effects model, the Hausman test for misspecification (Greene 2003, p. 301) is
employed. Under the null hypothesis, the random effects estimator is consistent and efficient,
while under the alternative, it is inconsistent. The fixed effects model is chosen if we reject the
null hypothesis. In the case of the crack ratio (crack spread), the χ2 test statistic is calculated
as 77.25 (102.76) and is significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the fixed effects estimator
is consistent and asymptotically efficient in both cases. Results of a modified Wald test for
groupwise heteroskedasticity (Greene 2003, p. 323) in a fixed effects panel data model indicate
that the null hypothesis of homoskedastic disturbances was rejected at the 1% significe level
with χ2 test statistic 157.36.
Based on the above specification test results, we employ a fixed effects panel data model
with correction for first-order serial correlation and groupwise heteroskedasticity. The panel
data regression model is specified as:
piit = αi +X
′
itβ + εit
εi,t = ρεi,t−1 + φi,t, φi,t ∼ N(0, σ2φi) (4.6)
where i = 1, ..., N denotes the cross-section dimension, the PADD regions, and t = 1, ..., T
denotes the time-series dimension. The autocorrelation coefficient | ρ |< 1 and φi,t is indepen-
dently distributed with zero mean and region-specific variance σ2φi . piit is the crack ratio or the
3-2-1 crack spread on the ith region for the tth time period. Xit is the K-dimensional vector
of explanatory variables defined earlier, in which regional gasoline imports are instrumented
by employing equation (4.5). Expression αi represents the regional fixed effect. After stacking
the n time series,
pii = αi +Xiβ + εi i = 1, ..., n.
Each submatrix has n observations. We also specify E(εi|X) = 0 and E(εiε′j) = σijΩij .
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Collecting the terms above, we have the full specification,
E(ε|X) = 0 and E(εε′) = Ω =

σ11Ω11 σ12Ω12 . . . σ1NΩ1N
σ21Ω21 σ22Ω22 . . . σ2NΩ2N
...
...
. . .
...
σN1ΩN1 σN2ΩN2 . . . σNNΩNN

where
Ωij =

1 ρj ρ2j . . . ρ
T−1
j
ρi 1 ρj . . . ρT−2j
ρ2i ρi 1 . . . ρ
T−3
j
...
...
...
. . .
...
ρT−1i ρ
T−2
i ρ
T−3
i . . . 1

.
Taking into account serial correlation and groupwise heteroskedasticity, a two-step, feasible,
efficient Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (Baum et al. 2007; Schaffer 2007)
is obtained through the following estimation procedure.
(a) Estimate Equation (4.6) using pooled OLS to get initial estimates βˆ0 = (X ′X)−1X ′pi.
(b) Form the residual uˆ = pi − Xβˆ0 and use these to form the optimal weighting matrix
Wˆ = Sˆ−1, which minimizes the asymptotic variance of the GMM estimator.
(c) Calculate the efficient GMM estimator βˆ1 and corresponding variance-covariance matrix
V (βˆ1) using the estimated optimal weighting matrix Wˆ in step (b). We get
βˆ1 = (X ′XWˆX ′X)−1X ′XWˆX ′pi
V (βˆ1) =
1
n
(Q¯′Wˆ Q¯)−1 where Q¯ =
1
n
X ′X (4.7)
In step (b), Sˆ is estimated as
Sˆ = Γˆ0 +
q∑
j=1
κ(
j
qn
)(Γˆj + Γˆ
′
j),
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where Γˆj = 1n
∑n−j
t=1 X
′
t uˆtuˆt−jXt−j are the sample autocovariance matrices for lag j computed
using consistent residuals uˆt from step (a). The kernel function, κ(j/qn), applies appropriate
weights to the summations, with qn defined as the bandwidth of the kernel. The Bartlett
kernel function proposed by Newey and West (1987) is employed as
κ(·) =

1− jqn if j ≤ qn − 1
0 otherwise
in our estimation. These estimates are said to be heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation con-
sistent (HAC) and are presented in table 4.4.
The crack ratio and crack spread are closed related as both are indicators of refiners profit
margin. It has been shown that joint estimation of two equations as a system of seemingly
unrelated regressions (SUR) to account for contemporaneous correlation may improve estima-
tion efficiency (Greene 2003, Ch. 14). In the joint estimation, error structures of the crack
ratio and crack spread equations are assumed to be characterized by panel heteroskedasticity,
first-order panel autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation. The regional gasoline im-
ports are instrumented using equation (4.5). Following the estimation framework suggested by
Blackwell (2005), the panel SUR estimation results are presented in table (4.5).
Analysis of Estimation Results
The estimations for the crack ratio and 3-2-1 crack spread yield similar results, and all explana-
tory variables have intuitive signs. Crude oil inventories, ethanol production, short-run supply
disruptions, market concentration represented by the HHI index, monthly gasoline import,
and dummy variables for months in the second and third quarters all significantly influence
the crack ratio and the 3-2-1 crack spread. The complexity adjusted distillation capacity has
a marginally significant and positive impact on the crack ratio. Higher crude oil inventories,
the spring and summer travel seasons, and historical short-term supply disruptions all lead to
higher levels of the crack ratio and the crack spread.
As expected, both ethanol production and gasoline import have considerably negative im-
pacts on the refinery margin, and the impacts are significant at the 1% level. This indicates
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that over the sample period, ethanol has a significant substitution effect on gasoline. Evalu-
ating at the sample mean, the wholesale gasoline price is found to be lowered by 14¢/gallon
because of ethanol production. Furthermore, ethanol production reduces the crack spread,
which indicates a reduction in refinery profits. At the average production level over the sample
period, the reduction in the crack spread due to ethanol production is estimated to be $1.33
per barrel.
The panel SUR estimation results in table (4.5) indicate consistent estimates for all the
explanatory variables except the equivalent distillation capacity and HHI index. In the joint
estimation, market concentration level are not significant in explaining the variation in both
gasoline price and refiners profitability, while EDC appears to have significant and positive
effects on both dependent variables.
Regional Analysis
To further investigate the negative effect of ethanol production on local retail gasoline prices,
it is instructive to analyze the time-series data of each region individually. Note that we have
switched from wholesale to retail prices for this portion of the analysis. We do this because
weighted retail prices represent local market conditions better than regional wholesale prices
that often represent one or two unique points in each region. The use of retail prices also
assists in the use of our results for policy purposes.
However there is an obvious problem with our use of retail prices. As we haven mentioned
earlier typical ethanol blends contain only 96.81% of the energy as regular gasoline. Therefore
one would expect that as more gallons of ethanol blend are sold then weighted retail prices
will eventually reflect this lower energy content. This comparison is complicated by differences
in state level subsidies to ethanol and by different local market conditions and regulations.
For example in some states ethanol is viewed as a way to improve the oxygenate level in
gasoline and as such it may not require a price reduction to clear this market. In other states
all regular gasoline is an ethanol blend. We did run the national model using national retail
prices and these results suggested that the national retail impact is 39¢ per gallon with signs
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and significance levels that are very similar to the national wholesale analysis described above.3
Each PADD region has unique supply and demand conditions of crude oil and refinery
products, different market structures and ethanol production and usage. The effects of ex-
planatory variables may differ considerably because of region-specific factors. The results of a
Durbin-Watson test and Box-Ljung Q test for autocorrelation (Greene 2003, p. 268-271) indi-
cate the presence of autocorrelation.4 Using the regional crack ratios as dependent variables,
the estimated coefficients for individual regions’ monthly data over January 1995 to March
2008 are reported in table 4.6.5
From the estimation results, ethanol production has significant and negative effects on
retail gasoline prices in all regions. And the magnitude of the effects varies with PADD
regions, ranging from -0.000016 to -0.000063. As expected, in PADD II, the Midwest, ethanol
production has the largest impact on retail gasoline prices. The substitution effect is highly
significant and reduces the gasoline price by 34¢ per gallon on average over the sample period.
The West Coast and East Coast experience similar negative ethanol impacts with estimates
of -0.000055 and -0.000052, which means that the corresponding gasoline price is lowered by
26¢ and 23¢ per gallon, respectively. The Gulf Coast, PADD III, has a coefficient estimate
of -0.000045, or, equivalently, a 20¢ per gallon reduction in retail gasoline prices. The Rocky
Mountain, or PADD IV, experienced the smallest downward gasoline price change, at 6.7¢ per
gallon, presumably because of this region’s comparatively low total ethanol consumption.
Welfare Analysis
In the following section, based on the estimated substitution effect of ethanol on gasoline in
2007, we develop an analytical model explicit in its accounting of ethanol, gasoline, and fuel
markets.6 We estimate the welfare impacts on agricultural and energy markets, and on overall
welfare change after accounting for reduced loan deficiency payments. The welfare changes are
3See the Appendix A.2.
4Test results for autocorrelation are in the Appendix A.3.
5In regional regressions, regular retail gasoline prices are used to construct the variable of regional crack ratio.
Using average wholesale gasoline data of individual regions, we only found significant negative substitution effects
on gasoline in PADD I, II, and V of 8.5¢, 15.4¢, and 12.9¢, respectively.
6Fuel refers to gasoline blended with ethanol used for transportation.
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estimated by both traditional consumer (producer) surplus formulas and compensating varia-
tion measure. Then, we validate the model’s underlying assumptions and test for sensitivity
of the main results to market parameters.
The Analytical Model
In the model, the corn market includes ethanol and non-ethanol demand and corn supply. The
fuel market includes gasoline and ethanol separately to disentangle the relationship between
these markets and better capture the substitution effect of ethanol on gasoline. We provide
graphical illustration of the corresponding welfare changes in terms of consumer and producer
surplus. This study does not explicitly evaluate the impact of the import tariff or the con-
sumption mandate. We do this because the import tariff is so similar in magnitude to the
blenders credit. Imported Brazilian ethanol is subject to the 54¢ import tariff but it then
benefits from the 51¢ blenders credit these two approximately offset each other. We ignore
the ethanol mandate because it was not binding in the base period because high energy prices
encouraged ethanol production to grow beyond the ethanol mandate that was in place that
year. Also we have not considered the impact of induced higher prices of other crops. It
seems likely that consumers of these other crops lost and that producers gained as a result of
ethanol subsidies. There was also a reduction in government loan deficiency payments to these
producers. We also ignore the possible environmental benefits or costs of ethanol production
and consumption.
Corn Market
Consider the standard supply and demand model for corn graphically depicted in figure 4.5
where SC is the supply schedule and DneC represents non-ethanol demand for corn including
feed, export, and other consumption. The equilibrium price and quantity are PC and QC ,
respectively. In this original equilibrium, given the loan rate in the 2002 Farm Security and
Rural Investment Act of 2002 (FSRI), corn producers receive a price of PLR for each bushel
of corn produced, yielding a total production of QLR bushels and the market clears at price
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P0. The loan deficiency payments (LDPs) program generates producer surplus of PLRC ′DPC ,
consumer surplus of PCDB′P0, and taxpayer costs of PLRC ′B′P0, which add up to a deadweight
loss of the area C ′DB′.
Increasing demand for ethanol production pushes up the equilibrium corn price to P
′
C ,
which is higher than the loan rate PLR. This higher equilibrium price results in the corn
production of Q
′
C , while non-ethanol demand drops to Q
′′
C . The amount of corn represented
by the distance of Q
′
C − Q
′′
C is used for ethanol production. Under price P
′
C , the total corn
demand curve including ethanol is DC . The total gain for producer is represented by the area
ACC
′
PLR, while the loss of consumer surplus is the area ABB
′
P0. The taxpayer cost of moving
the corn demand curve out is considered within the energy market because it appears in the
form of a blenders tax credit. In addition, this higher equilibrium corn price eliminates the
LDPs to farmers. The corresponding welfare gain for taxpayers is the shaded area PLRC
′
B
′
P0
in figure 4.5.7
Ethanol, Gasoline, and Transportation Fuel Markets
The markets for ethanol, gasoline and fuel are in the left and right panels of figure 4.6. The
horizontal axis is measured in gallons of gasoline equivalent and the vertical axis is measured in
the price of gasoline (or fuel) because that the energy of 2.66 gallons of ethanol is equivalent to
1.74 gallons of gasoline. That is we measure the quantity of ethanol in 0.65 gallon units. When
we measure the blenders tax credit in energy equivalence it is equal to 78¢ per gallon. Demand
for non-fuel ethanol and total ethanol supply are represented by Dnfe and Se, respectively, and
appear backwards in the left panel of figure 4.6. We assume the U.S. non-fuel ethanol demand
is perfectly inelastic because demand for unadulterated ethanol is used primarily in medicine
and very small, at 380 million gallons in 2007.
In the right panel of figure 4.6, supply in the gasoline market is given by Sg. Without the
ethanol tax credit t, equilibrium prices are Pnfe and Pg in the two respective markets. Ethanol
demand for fuel use is zero at this original equilibrium price. The amount of ethanol that will
7Averaged over 2005 and 2006, the LDPs for corn is about 81% of total payments.
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be supplied for fuel at higher price than Pnfe is given by the excess supply curve XSe. The 51¢
federal tax credit t (or 78¢ in gasoline equivalent unit) has the effect of shifting the demand
for ethanol to D
′
e. The intersection of demand and supply curves leads to the new equilibrium
ethanol price of P fe , at which the excess supply of ethanol used in fuel is represented by FH
(= P fe H ′ on the excess supply curve in the right panel). In the ethanol market, producers gain
is represented by the hatched area FP fe P
nf
e G and consumer surplus doesn’t change because
the non-fuel ethanol demand curve is vertical.
We shift down the excess supply curve of ethanol by the amount of the tax credit t to XS
′
e.
The new fuel supply curve is Sf with the amount of ethanol PfI (= P
f
e H ′) and gasoline PfJ .
The resulting equilibrium fuel price is Pf . Gasoline use is reduced by the amount of JL, which
is substituted by ethanol, and fuel consumption is increased by the distance of LK because
of the lower price of fuel. In the total fuel demand of PfK, the amount of JK is met by
ethanol, which is equal to the amount of PfI. Gasoline producers lose the area PgMJPf and
fuel consumers gain the area PgMKPf . The net change of consumer and producer surpluses
is represented by the hatched area MKJ . The amount of government payments for ethanol
tax credit is represented by the shaded area P fe H ′IPf . The producer surplus in the ethanol
market is the shaded area FHG in the left panel of figure 4.6. We assume that the non-fuel
ethanol demand is negligible compared with fuel ethanol production.
The total ethanol tax credit t consists of three components: (1) the reduction in fuel
price because of ethanol substitution denoted by Pg − Pf ; (2) the price change in the ethanol
market, P fe −Pnfe ; (3) the price difference between Pnfe and Pg. The prices change of P fe −Pnfe
represents the “wasted” portion of the tax credit, which is used to make the ethanol production
economically feasible and referred as “water” (de Gorter and Just 2007). Although qualitative
relations exist among these three components, the specific cut-off points vary over time and
critically depend on corn and crude oil price.
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Welfare Estimates
Given the annual market data and assumed parameters, as shown in table 4.7, the net welfare
loss in the U.S. corn market is approximately $2.12 billion, as presented in table 4.8. The
welfare gain from the reduced LDPs for corn are $3.45 billion according to the average actual
payments of 2005 and 2006.8 The change of producer surplus in the ethanol market is about
$0.86 billion, while the net welfare change before the government cost of the ethanol credit is
estimated to be $0.79 billion in the gasoline/fuel market. Ethanol production in 2007 provided
a benefit to corn, ethanol producers and gasoline/fuel consumers. It reduced welfare for grain
consumers and gasoline refiners. The overall net welfare loss is approximately $0.28 billion.
The basic parameters assumed for U.S. corn and gasoline markets are summarized in table
4.7. In the corn market, the elasticity of demand is assumed to be -0.15 with range of -0.10 to
-0.20, while the elasticity of supply is 0.27 ranging and ranges from 0.13 to 0.40. We take these
parameters from Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008).9 The short-run gasoline elasticities of demand
is -0.35 with the range of -0.2 to -0.5 and that of supply is 0.25 varying from 0.1 to 0.4 The
elasticity parameters in the gasoline market are based on the survey of Graham and Glaister
(2002).
We calibrate the model to 2007 market data of price and production, which are also reported
in table 4.7. There are three important price changes for the welfare analysis including (1) the
reduction in fuel price, Pg−Pf , which is about 23¢ using estimated coefficient in the empirical
analysis; (2) the increase of corn price, P
′
C − PC , which is $1.27 reported in Tokgoz et al.
(2007); (3) the price change in ethanol market, P fe − Pnfe . We use average weekly ethanol
prices of Chicago in 2005 and 2007 to proxy P fe and P
nf
e , respectively, which results in the
ethanol price change of 27¢ (or 41¢ in gasoline equivalent units). The ethanol weekly prices
are obtained from Ethanol and Biofuel News.
8The actual LDPs data are obtained from the CCC Budget Essentials of the Farm Service Agency
(FSA) http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=about&subject=landing&topic=bap-bu-cc, last visited
10/08/2008.
9We use the ranges of demand and supply elasticities in the following section to test for sensitivity of the
welfare estimates.
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Sensitivity Analysis
Gardner and Tyner (2008) point out that elasticity assumption is critical for the evaluation
of welfare changes since these parameters summarize the price responsiveness to policy inter-
ventions. In order to test for the sensitivity of our welfare estimates on these assumptions, we
evaluate the overall welfare changes for the given ranges of demand and supply elasticities of
corn and gasoline markets. The results are depicted in figures ?? and ??. The net welfare loss
varies from $0.05 billion to $1.19 billion as corn demand and supply elasticities vary in the
given ranges. Similarly, the net welfare loss is in the range of $0.02 billion to $0.79 billion as
elasticities of gasoline change.
It is known that ordinary consumer surplus measure requires a restrictive path-independence
condition on the utility function and constant marginal utility of income so as to ensure its
uniqueness as a money measure (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz 2004, p. 136). Compensating and
equivalent variation is the recommended alternative and provides measures related to actual
changes in utility. Following the indirect estimation method developed in Willig (1976) and
Just, Hueth, and Schmitz (2004, Section 6.5), we calculate the approximate compensating vari-
ations in corn and gasoline markets. These approximations are based on the income elasticities
and disposable personal income of 2007 as reported in table 4.7 and the approximation formula:
ĈV = 4CS(1− δˆ); δˆ = η|s|
2
; s =
4CS
m
. (4.8)
where the compensating variation is denoted by CV, 4CS is the change in consumer sur-
plus. η represents the income elasticity of demand while disposable personal income is m.
The approximation results are presented in table 4.8. Because of the small ratio of surplus
change to total income (< 0.01 in both cases) and income elasticity, the difference between
two consumer welfare measures are very small. The estimated total net welfare loss based on
the compensating variation measure is about $0.30 billion.
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Conclusion
Accounting for temporal autocorrelation and regional heterogeneity, we employ a fixed effects
panel data model to quantify the possible impact of ethanol on gasoline in the U.S. as a
whole and in five regions of the U.S. Estimation results show a significant negative effect of
increasing ethanol production on wholesale gasoline prices. In addition, the impact on retail
gasoline prices varies considerably across regions, with the largest impact of 34¢/gallon in the
Midwest. Refinery market concentration is found to significantly increase the gasoline price
and the refinery margin. It is also found that increasing downstream processing capacity is
marginally significant in explaining changes in gasoline prices. The results also suggest that
the ethanol-induced reduction in gasoline prices came at the expense of refiners’ profits, of
approximately $1.33 per barrel.
These reductions in retail gasoline prices are surprisingly large, especially when one con-
siders that they are calculated at their mean values over the sample period. The availability
of ethanol essentially increased the ”capacity” of the U.S. refinery industry and in so doing
prevented some of the dramatic price increases often associated with an industry operating at
close to capacity. Because these results are based on capacity, it would be wrong to extrapo-
late the results to today’s markets. Had we not had ethanol, it seems likely that the crude oil
refining industry would be slightly larger today than it actually is, and in the absence of this
additional crude oil refining capacity, the impact of eliminating ethanol would be extreme.
Government support policies coupled with high energy prices stimulated a rapid increase
in ethanol production and associated welfare transfers in multiple markets. We find that
the net welfare change of the U.S. ethanol subsidy is negative, a result that is robust with
respect to a reasonable range of alternative parameter values. The markets for agricultural
commodities were not competitive prior to large-scale ethanol production because there was
already significant intervention in the form of farm subsidies. Our results show that subsidizing
U.S. ethanol production generated a small aggregate welfare loss, while also reducing the
distortion associated with farm payments.
Our research suggests the need for future research in the following areas. First, the relation-
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ship among crude oil, ethanol, gasoline, corn, and food prices needs further investigation. Corn
prices have traditionally been affected by energy prices through production costs. Empirical
analysis of linkages between energy and agricultural sectors has important policy implications
in terms of the negative consequences of higher food prices. Second, as refinery economic
performance becomes increasingly driven by heavy, sour crude oil coking processes, the 3-2-1
crack spread formula needs to be extended to more accurately reflect refinery profitability.
This requires more detailed price and production cost information on different types of crude
oil and refinery products. Finally, for the welfare analysis, incorporating other forms of govern-
ment support policies such as ethanol mandates and import tariff is one of the future possible
extensions. Also, further work on the global welfare impact of ethanol production appears
necessary for better economic assessment of ethanol support policies.
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Appendix
A.1. Fixed Effects Model Estimates Using RBOB Prices
Crack Ratio 3-2-1 Crack Spread
Estimate Robust Std. Err. Estimate Robust Std. Err.
Oil stock 9.70e-07* 5.60e-07 2.54e-09* 1.46e-09
Gasoline stock -.000019*** 5.49e-06 -6.04e-08*** 1.75e-08
EDC -1.64e-08 3.89e-08 -3.04e-12 1.42e-10
Ethanol production -.000019*** 6.65e-06 -5.16e-08*** 2.25e-08
Gasoline import .000010 7.30e-06 6.98e-09 2.94e-08
HHI -.0015 .0016 -2.21e-06 5.56e-06
January .078** .034 .000034 .00011
February .092** .040 .00035** .00014
March .16*** .052 .00061*** .00018
April .29*** .025 .00062*** .00013
May .32*** .035 .00052*** .00015
June .23*** .021 .00079*** .00012
July .16*** .036 .00042** .00018
August -.0065 .032 -.00019 .00018
September -.088*** .021 -.00048*** .00014
October -.085 .027 -.00038** .00015
November -.053** .022 -.00012 .00010
R2 0.8748 0.8045
Note: The STATA xtivreg2 command with the robust and bw options is used. Single (*), double
(*), and triple (***) asterisks denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Because of the availability of RBOB prices, only monthly data of PADD I, III, and V over the
period of May 2006 - March 2008 are included.
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A.2. Fixed Effects Estimates Using Retail Gas Prices
Crack Ratio
Estimate Robust Std. Err.
Oil stock .000012*** 3.52e-06
Gasoline stock .000023*** 1.91e-06
EDC 3.17e-08 9.09e-09
Ethanol production -.000086*** 9.55e-06
Supply disruption .037 .078
Gasoline import .000033*** 9.87e-06
HHI .00012 .00019
January -.076*** 9.55e-06
February -.11*** .031
March -.022 .037
April .024 .044
May .055 .052
June .064 .046
July .033 .041
August .043 .033
September .0079 .038
October .0088 .034
November -.024 .030
R2 0.6282
Note: The STATA xtivreg2 command with the robust and bw
options is used. Single (*), double (*), and triple (***) asterisks
denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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A.3. Regional Autocorrelation Tests on Crack Ratio
Durbin-Watson test Box-Ljung Q test
PADD I .635 377.40***
PADD II .807 277.89***
PADD III .646 509.25***
PADD IV .294 646.15***
PADD V .331 626.78***
Note: Single (*), double (*), and triple (***) asterisks denote
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 4.2 Nelson Complexity Index of Downstream Processing Units
Processing unit Nelson Complexity Index
Crude atmospheric distillation 1
Downstream operation:
Vacuum distillation process 2
Thermal cracking 2.75
Fluid & delayed coking 6
Catalytic cracking 6
Catalytic reforming 5
Catalytic hydrotreating 3
Note: Because of data limitation, we only consider the above down-
stream processing units in the EDC calculation.
Table 4.3 Panel Unit Root Tests Results
Tests Crack ratio 3-2-1 Crack spread
LLC -10.25*** -12.33***
IPS -5.04*** -5.80***
CADF -6.04*** -5.67***
Note: Rows LLC, IPS, and CADF report the LLC, IPS, and
CADF panel unit root tests. Single(*), double (*), and triple
(***) asterisks denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01
levels,respectively. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected
if the test statistic is significant.
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Table 4.4 Fixed Effects Model Extimates on Crack Ratio and Crack Spread
Crack Ratio 3-2-1 Crack Spread
Estimate Robust Std. Err. Estimate Robust Std. Err.
Oil stock 3.55e-06** 1.65e-06 .000083*** .000015
Gasoline stock 3.36e-06 3.87e-06 -.000014 .000042
EDC 2.67e-09 3.54e-09 4.64e-08 5.25e-08
Ethanol production -.000031*** 3.77e-06 -.00025*** .000061
Supply disruption .12*** .037 .79 .64
Gasoline import -.000016** 7.10e-06 -.00040*** .000061
HHI .00018** .000084 .0024** .0010
January .00090 .011 -.24 .19
February .0017 .013 .36 .22
March .091*** .015 1.91*** .26
April .16*** .020 3.32*** .34
May .19*** .022 3.51*** .43
June .15*** .019 2.91*** .39
July .10*** .017 2.22*** .29
August .10*** .018 2.67*** .28
September .071*** .018 2.66*** .36
October .034* .018 2.02*** .35
November .014 .014 .63 .22
R2 0.4349 0.3643
Note: The STATA xtivreg2 command with the robust and bw options is used. Single (*), double (*), and
triple (***) asterisks denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 4.5 Panel SUR Estimates on Crack Ratio and Crack Spread
Crack Ratio 3-2-1 Crack Spread
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Oil stock 4.73e-07** 2.42e-07 6.86e-06 4.32e-06
Gasoline stock 4.02e-07 4.41e-07 -1.58e-06 9.17e-06
EDC 5.79e-09*** 1.25e-09 1.13e-07*** 1.84e-08
Ethanol production -.000026*** 4.16e-06 -.00019*** .000062
Supply disruption .17*** .041 2.27*** .77
Gasoline import -3.51e-06*** 8.71e-07 -.000078*** .000019
HHI .000015 .000029 .00025 .00051
January .023 .015 .10 .29
February .012 .019 .34 .36
March .067*** .021 1.40*** .39
April .12*** .023 2.44*** .42
May .13*** .023 2.67*** .43
June .095*** .023 2.26*** .43
July .071*** .023 1.63*** .43
August .059*** .022 1.67*** .42
September .023 .021 1.46*** .40
October .0040 .019 1.10*** .37
November .00091 .015 .34 .29
Note: Single (*), double (*), and triple (***) asterisks denote significance at the 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 4.6 Regression Results on Crack Ratio with Individual PADD Data
PADD I PADD II PADD III PADD IV PADD V
Oil stock .000026 .000020*** 9.38e-06*** -.000033 -8.64e-06
Gasoline stock .000024*** .000013 .000024** -.00014* .000017
Distillation cap. .00094* .0015 7.5e-08 -.0077*** -.0042***
Ethanol prod. -.000052*** -0.000063*** -.000045** -.000016*** -.000055**
Supply disrup. .68*** -0.26 .66** .56* .08
Gasoline import -.000066*** .0035** -.000099 -.013 .00049***
HHI -.00028 -.00074 -.0028** .0012 .001
January -.034 .024 -.029 .055 -.067
February -.066 .056 -.034 .079 -.072
March .029 -.06 -.037 .18* -.12
April .056 -.084 -.029 .28** -.075
May .016 -.19 -.022 .18 -.15
June -.013 .019 -.027 .12 -.0027
July .0043 -.059 -.046 .12 -.11
August .0019 -.096 -.038 .14 -.24
September -.069 -.0099 -.095 .13 -.18
October .014 -.031 -.058 .26** .0058
November -.041 -.049 -.081* .11* -.062
Constant -1.09 -6.61* -.012 -.31 13.23***
R2 .7251 .6148 .8309 .7293 .6070
Note: The STATA ivreg2 command with bw option is used. Single (*), double (*), and triple (***) asterisks
denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 4.7 Basic Market Parameters
Paremeters U.S. corn market U.S. gasoline market U.S. ethanol market
Price elasticity in demand -0.15 -0.35 –
Price elasticity in supply 0.27 0.25 –
Average price in 2007 $3.40/bu. $2.84/gal. $2.01/gal.
Total production in 2007 13.07 billion bu. 142 billion gal. 6.4 billion gal.
Change in price $1.27/bu. $0.23/gal. $0.27/gal.
Income elasticity of demand 0.1 0.4 –
Disposable personal income
in 2007 (billion dollars) 10,170.41
Table 4.8 Welfare Changes of Corn, Ethanol, Gasoline/Fuel Markets, 2007
Corn market (billion dollars)
Change in consumer surplus (CS) -16.17
Compensating variation (CV) -16.17
Change in producer surplus (PS) 14.05
Change in CS & PS -2.12
Change in CV & PS -2.12
Reduced LDPs 3.45
Gasoline market (billion dollars)
Change in CS 32.20
Change in CV 32.18
Change in PS -31.40
Change in CS & PS 0.79
Change in CV & PS 0.77
Ethanol market
Change in PS (billion dollars) 0.86
Volumetric excise tax credit in U.S. (dollars per gallon) 0.51
U.S. taxpayer cost of tax credit (billion dollars) 3.26
Net welfare loss (billion dollars)
(based on CS) 0.28
(based on CV) 0.30
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Figure 4.1 Crack Ratio, Jan. 1995 - Mar. 2008
Figure 4.2 Deflated 3:2:1 Crack Spread, Jan. 1995 - Mar. 2008
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Figure 4.3 Annual Equivalent Distillation Capacity (10,000 barrels/steam
day)
Figure 4.4 Annual HHI, 1995-2007
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Figure 4.5 Corn Market
Figure 4.6 Ethanol, Gasoline, and Transportation Fuel Markets
